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LAND AND WATER LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
Any edition of any major newspaper reveals concrete examples of how
our national resolve to preserve natural amenities clashes with our deter-
mination to develop the nation's resources. In the federal sphere, the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA")' is a "constitution"2
intended to chart agencies' paths towards the environmental goals of our
society. Experience and interpretation have filled the interstices of
NEPA's general language. Additionally, after nearly twenty years of exis-
tence, NEPA's essential function is characterized as a procedural mecha-
nism, 3 not a substantive power to forbid environmentally damaging
activity." NEPA's teeth lie in Section 102, which contains a deceptively
simple Congressional requirement. In certain circumstances, a "detailed
statement" examining the following five subjects must accompany a
decision:
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be avoided
should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-term
productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.'
Those who work with NEPA call the detailed statement an "Environmen-
tal Impact Statement" ("EIS").6
1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370(a) (1982 & Supp. III 1985).
2. Compare Frankfurter, The Task Of Administrative Law, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 614,
618 (1927), who likens administrative law to constitutional law because both approach their
goals through institutionalized process, not detailed codes of prohibitions.
3. Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council, Inc. v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223, 227-28 (1980);
Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 435 U.S. 519,
558 (1978); Scalia, Responsibilities of Regulatory Agencies under Environmental Laws, 24
Hous. L. REV. 97, 98 (1987) (courts reverse agencies because of faulty process, not because
of a decision's result).
4. Section 101 of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331 (1982) includes the policy that
"Congress recognizes that each person should enjoy a healthful environment..."; however,
no "right" to such an environment emerged despite a tentative movement towards one. Com-
pare Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Committee, Inc. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,1113-15 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (limited substantive review of an agency's choice) with Strycker's Bay Neighborhood
Counci4 444 U.S. at 227-28 (NEPA only mandates procedural review). See also Methow Valley
Citizens Council v. Regional Forester, 833 F.2d 810, 813-14 (9th Cir. 1987) and Oregon Natural
Resources Council v. Marsh, 832 F.2d 1489 (9th Cir. 1987), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869
(U.S. June 27, 1988) (Nos. 87-1703 and 87-1704, consolidated for argument). The Justice
Department interpreted these cases as imposing a duty to mitigate harm upon agencies
through NEPA. 19 Env't Rep. 298-99 (BNA) (July 1, 1988). See generally Gray, NEPA: Wait-
ing for the Other Shoe to Drop, 55 CM-KENT L. REV. 361, 370 (1979).
5. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982).
6. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.11 (1987).
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Much dispute surrounds what situations require an EIS.' This pro-
vides the topic of this article, which reviews three cases that point the
way towards a paradigm of NEPA compliance that best merges the goals
of NEPA with practical reality. The cases grappled with the question of
EIS necessity in the context of grants of federal on-shore oil and gas leases.
The fundamental question before the three courts was whether a "pro-
posal[ I for ... major Federal action[ ] significantly affecting the quality
of the human environment"8 existed.
The cases do not reach identical holdings. The first in time, Sierra Club
v. Peterson,9 required an E IS when a lease authorized development without
retaining the right to forbid future activity if environmental concerns were
revealed upon later analysis. Conversely, leases with an agency "veto"
provision could have the detailed statement deferred. 0 The second deci-
sion, Conner v. Burford," disagreed with Sierra Club at the district court
level: An EIS must precede lease authorization even if the leases allowed
the government to preclude activity.
The Ninth Circuit reversed this holding, thus aligning itself with the
Sierra Club court." The third case, Park County Resources Council v.
United States Department of Agriculture, 13 proceeded down a different
path. It found no pre-issuance E IS necessary for a lease on which future
development could not be prohibited, but only mitigated to avert environ-
mental harm discovered by later analysis." At first glance, the courts
appear to provide conflicting responses to the problem of when to pre-
pare an EIS. The Conner and Sierra Club resolutions initially seem the
most protective of the preservationist stance.
7. The Act was perhaps intentionally vague because NEPA applies to agencies with
disparate functions. One commentator, however, traces criticisms of NEPA's effectiveness
to § 102's ambiguous and indeterminate language, which has minimal legislative history.
Case-by-case implementation by courts resulted. Stenzel, The Need for a National Risk Assess-
ment Communication Policy, 11 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 381 (1987).
8. Section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1982). It also requires
that "all agencies of the Federal Government... include [a detailed statement] in every
recommendation or report on proposals for legislation .... For explication of the require-
ment's dual nature, see Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S. 347, 362 (1979). The Council on
Environmental Quality ("CEQ") defined the elements. See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.3, 1508.8,
1508.12, 1508.14, 1508.17, 1508.18, 1508.23, and 1508.27 (1987). Despite the mandatory nature
of these regulations, room for interpretation remains. See Andrus v. Sierra Club, 442 U.S.
at 358.
9. 17 Env't Rep. Cas. 1449 (BNA) (D.D.C. 1982), affd. in part and rev'd in part, 717
F.2d 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1983).
10. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1415.
11. 605 F. Supp. 107 (D. Mont. 1985), affd in part and rev'd in part and remanded,
836 F.2d 1521 (9th Cir. 1988), superseded, 848 F.2d 1441 (9th Cir. 1988).
12. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1446-51 (leases without veto provisions require EIS's). On
another issue, concerning the Endangered Species Act (16 U.S.C. § 1536), the district court
was affirmed. Both courts required a finding on whether lease development, as opposed to
lease issuance, would be "likely to jeopardize the continued existence of any threatened or
endangered species" before the grant of the lease despite the agency's reserved power to
stop future activity if jeopardy would be likely to occur. Id. at 1451-52. One judge dissented
and the Department of the Interior received a rehearing, but the decision was not changed.
13. 817 F.2d 609 (10th Cir. 1987).
14. Id
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However, Park County on its merits is not a loss for environmen-
talists. 5 The Tenth Circuit's substantive rulings help return the NEPA
exercise to its proper place, namely, as an impetus to improved decision-
making. They ensure that agencies concentrate on the actual physical
environment to be affected by any proposed action. For habituds of the
national forests and public lands, its holding can lead to laudable results. 16
Nevertheless, no pervasive "rule of law" emerges from any one of the
three cases because, if NEPA is properly applied, the agency must focus
on specific impacts from defined activity. The reconciled holdings of the
three cases contain a flexible approach to the question of whether, in
assessing a particular action's impacts, the agencies must consider full
oil and gas development of the area or some lesser level of activity. This
is as it should be.
Before analyzing this conclusion, section II outlines the federal oil and
gas leasing system and its conflict with the Wilderness Act. Next, sec-
tion III reviews the three cases in detail, leading to a reconciliation of
their holdings in the next section. Section IV also examines the holdings
in the context of general NEPA litigation, focusing on definitions of the
term "proposal," approaches to the use of mitigation to limit the sig-
nificance of impacts, and requirements to broaden analysis beyond the
immediate activity before the agency. Finally, section V constructs a
framework designed to promote meaningful analysis and balance the con-
flicting desires of development and preservation to avoid both paralysis
and blind decisionmaking.
II. THE STATUTORY FRAMEWORK: THE MINERAL LEASING ACT
AND THE WILDERNESS ACT
A. Conflicts Between Wilderness Preservation and Mineral Development
Before explaining the leasing process, a brief look at why these par-
ticular leases sparked litigation is in order." In 1964, Congress adopted
a policy and procedure for maintenance of wilderness values, with wilder-
ness defined as "an area of undeveloped Federal land retaining its primeval
character and influence .... which.. . generally appears to have been
affected primarily by the forces of nature, with the imprint of man's work
substantially unnoticeable." 8 The passage of the Wilderness Act did not
15. The case also contains procedural rulings immediately recognizable as helpful to
the environmental cause. Id at 616-20, discussed in text accompanying notes 149-60, infra.
16. Professor Rodgers distinguishes between a habitud and a drifter. A drifter has only
a short-term, one-shot goal and therefore seeks to maximize an advantage in one dispute.
A habitu6, however, has a continuing nexus to a problem and has a greater stake in the overall
process of dispute resolution. Rodgers, The Evolution of Cooperation in Natural Resources
Law: The Difter/Habitu6 Distinction, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 195 (1986).
17. For more extensive background on wilderness issues, see, e.g., Leshy, Wilderness
and Its Discontents - Wilderness Review Comes to Public Lands, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 361;
Symposium: Wilderness and the Public Lands, 16 IDAHo L. REV. 379 (1980); and Nelson,
Oil and Gas Leasing on Forest Service Lands: A Question of NEPA Compliance, 3 Pua. LAND
L. REV. 1, 38-44 (1982).
18. 16 U.S.C. § 1131(c) (1982). Additionally, the Act requires a wilderness to contain
at least 5,000 acres, be "roadless," and have "outstanding opportunities for solitude or a
primitive and unconfined type of recreation." Id
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end conflicts between preservation and development. Even in designated
wilderness areas, which are to receive special management, mineral leas-
ing and mining claim location generally were permitted until December
31, 1983.19 Until the Reagan administration, however, little or no mineral
leasing took place in either designated wilderness areas or in areas being
studied for inclusion in the system.
2 0
At first, the failure to lease created few disputes. Wilderness areas
and potential wildernesses were often remote and unattractive to oil and
gas companies because of drilling expenses and the lack of reliable data.
The calm ended when oil prices rose and preliminary information revealed
a geological feature, the Overthrust Belt, which coincided in part with
potential wilderness.2 ' Exceedingly encouraging estimates of the feature's
potential undiscovered oil and gas reserves circulated. 2 Even if these
figures were optimistic, the stage was set for the inevitable conflict.
23
An administration more oriented towards development than was its
predecessor provided another key element for conflict. In addition, at least
one court pressured the Department of the Interior to commence deci-
sionmaking on oil and gas lease applications in areas that overlapped
potential wilderness without awaiting final planning documents. 4 Leases
began to be issued. Congress occasionally entered the fray on the side of
preservation.2' It did not act conclusively until December of 1987, when
19. Id. at 1133(d)(3) (unless a particular statute designating an area stated otherwise).
For an explanation of the compromise, see Leshy, supra note 17, at 392-94.
20. The original 1964 Act required the Forest Service, Fish and Wildlife Service and
Park Service to review their lands to make recommendations for inclusions into the system.
16 U.S.C. §§ 1132(b) and (c). In 1976, the BLM received similar instructions. 43 U.S.C. §
1732 (1982). For more extensive historical background, see Note, Oil and Gas Leasing on
Wilderness Lands: The Federal Land Policy and Management Act, the Wilderness Act, and
the United States Department of the Interior, 14 ENVTL. L. 585 (1984); Edelson, The Manage-
ment of Oil and Gas Leasing on Federal Wilderness Lands, 10 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
905, 907-09, 917-18 (1983); and Gill, Intergovernmental Restraints on Oil and Gas Develop-
ment, 16 LAND & WATER L. REV. 457, 468-74 (1981).
21. More specifically, it was beneath 95% of the possible wilderness candidates in Mon-
tana, 54% of those in Utah, 39% in Idaho, and 37% in Wyoming. Note, supra note 20, at
587-90. See also Noble, Oil and Gas Leasing on Public Lands: NEPA Gets Lost in the Shuf-
fle, 6 HARv. ENVTL. L. REV. 117, 118 (1982).
22. E.g., those cited by the Wyoming District Court, namely, undiscovered recovera-
ble oil in the Montana portion of the belt alone as high as 10 billion barrels, together with
a potential reserve of 100 trillion feet of natural gas. Additionally, for the Overthrust Belt
in Idaho, Wyoming, and Utah, estimates of undiscovered oil approached 15 billion barrels.
Natural gas estimates reached 75 trillion cubic feet. Mountain States Legal Foundation v.
Andrus, 499 F.Supp. 383, 386 (D.C. Wyo. 1980) [hereinafter Mountain States 11.
23. See, e.g., Bob Marshall Alliance v. Hodel, 852 F.2d 1223, 1226 (9th Cir. 1988) (Deep
Creek area rated high for both wilderness and potential gas recovery, necessitating more
planning).
24. Id See also Mountain States Legal Foundation v. Hodel, 668 F. Supp. 1466 (D.C.
Wyo. 1987) [hereinafter Mountain States II] and, generally, Edelson, supra note 20, at 907-09
and Note, supra note 20, at 602-08.
25. Pacific Legal Foundation v. Watt, 529 F. Supp. 982, clarified, 539 F. Supp. 1194
(D. Mont. 1981). For details of appropriation bills and emergency withdrawals ordered by
Congress, see Note, supra note 20, at 608-13 and Watson, Mineral and Oil and Gas Develop-
ment in Wilderness Areas and Other Specially Managed Federal Lands in the United States,
29 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 37, 50-53, 66, 68-69 (1983). For later bills, see Continuing
Appropriations Act, 1985, 98 Stat. 1837, 1871 (1984) and The Appropriations Act, 1987,
100 Stat. 3341-261 (1986).
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it amended the Mineral Leasing Act to forbid leasing in areas recom-
mended for wilderness allocation by federal agencies or being studied for
such recommendations,26 but despite this action, conflicts between wilder-
ness and oil and gas development still remain on issued leases and may
affect some pending lease applications. 27 Moreover, areas rejected from
wilderness consideration may have other significant values worthy of pro-
tection from negative impact. Therefore, it is necessary to ascertain what,
if any, threat to the environment a federal oil and gas lease poses.
B. The Nature of a Federal Oil and Gas Lease
1. General Method of Issuance Before 1987 Amendments
When the three cases arose, there were two statutory ways to gain
rights to develop federally owned oil and gas reserves under the general
Mineral Lands Leasing Act of 1920.28 Pursuant to the then relevant terms
of the statute, lands in "Known Geological Structures" ("KGS's") were
leased by competitive bid.29 Lands outside a KGS were leased non-
competitively, that is, to the first qualified applicant, without bidding or
market value appraisal. 30 Such lands could be valuable prospects for
development or rank wildcat acreage."1 The leases at issue in all three cases
26. As part of Title V of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203),
Congress passed "The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987," 101 Stat.
1330-256 et seq. [hereinafter Leasing Reform Act]. Section 5112 thereof, creating a new 30
U.S.C. § 226-3, prohibited leasing in certain areas.
27. Section 5106 of the Leasing Reform Act provides, with some named exceptions,
that bids and applications for leases pending on December 22, 1987, "shall be processed,
and leases shall be issued under the provisions... in effect before... amendment by this
subtitle .... This grandfather clause was constitutionally unnecessary. See text at and
authorities cited at notes 41 and 52, infra. See also Eugene Water and Electric Board, 98
IBLA 272, 273-74 (July 10, 1987) (rejection of geothermal lease offer filed in 1978 for lands
in designated wilderness). Some pending offers may be eliminated because the appropria-
tions act for fiscal year 1987 prohibited spending money to process leases or drilling proposals
in potential wilderness areas except in certain circumstances. The savings provision that
made prior law govern excepted situations "where the issuance of any such lease would not
be lawful under such provision [the unamended act] or other applicable law." Leasing Reform
Act, supra note 26, § 5106 (b).
28. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181 et seq., (especially 226) (1982). Specialized acts apply to resources
in acquired lands and under rights-of-way. Id at § 351 and § 301. For a simplified overview,
see Hall, Leasing of Oil and Gas Interests on Federal Lands, 6 E. MIN. L. INST. 13-1 (1985).
For those often involved with public lands, one of the more useful provisions of the new act
was its change of the short title of the chapter to the "Mineral Leasing Act." Leasing Reform
Act, supra note 26, § 5113.
29. 30 U.S.C. § 226(b)(1), before amendment by the Leasing Reform Act.
30. 30 U.S.C. § 226(c), before amendment by the Leasing Reform Act, which abolished
the distinction between lands within and outside KGS's. All land must now be put up for
competitive bidding before it may be leased non-competitively. Congress established a mini-
mum bid of $2 per acre, which may be changed by regulation after two years, and this will
be deemed acceptable without reference to the lands' actual value. If no lease issues as a
result of the auction, the first qualified applicant after 30 days may receive a lease. If the
lands remain unleased for two years or a lease expires, then the bidding process must begin
again. Leasing Reform Act, supra note 26, § 5102(a) and (b), amending 30 U.S.C. §§ 226(b)(1)
and (c).
31. See Comment, Toward an All-Competitive System for Federal Onshore Oil and Gas
Leasing, 21 HARV. J. ON LSGIS. 531, 537 (1984). (Although many leases were worthless and
never incited drilling interest, others resold soon after issuance and earned profits for the
grantees of several million dollars.)
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were non-competitive leases, for which the applicants might have invested
little to obtain the lease.2
The Bureau of Land Management ("BLM"), an agency of the Depart-
ment of Interior, issued numerous noncompetitive leases each year.
3
Leases issued by it not only cover oil and gas underlying the public lands,
but also minerals in lands in national forests2 4 The three cases involved
lands under the jurisdiction of the Forest Service, an agency of the Depart-
ment of Agriculture. Therefore, additional complications entered the
deliberative process.
The BLM maintained that it must be the final arbiter and indepen-
dently assess the propriety of lease grants and terms." Nevertheless, in
practice, the BLM generally accepted Forest Service recommendations
on whether leasing would be advisable and what terms would be suitable
if a lease were to issue. 6 This process could constitute an abdication of
the BLM's duty to administer the mineral laws,3 7 or, conversely, an
untoward interference in the Forest Service's management of the surface
resources.38 Congress recently settled the dispute. The BLM may not issue
an oil and gas lease within a national forest over the objection of the Secre-
tary of Agriculture." Additionally, the Forest Service gains explicit con-
trol over surface-disturbing activities conducted pursuant to an oil and
gas lease.40
32. An application fee of $75 and rental of $1 an acre per year. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3111.1-1
(a) and 3103.2-2(b) (1987); Comment, supra note 31, at 536-39.
33. The Mineral Leasing Act vests the Secretary of Interior with lease issuance authority
and the BLM is the agency within the Department designated to carry out these functions.
See regulations under the old act, 43 C.F.R. Subparts 3111 and 3112 (1987), revised 53 Fed.
Reg. 22,814 (June 17, 1988). Total leases in fiscal year 1984 numbered 5478. Park County,
817 F.2d at 623. For fiscal year 1987, 576 over-the-counter leases and 5781 simultaneous
system leases were issued. BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPT. OF INTERIOR, PUB-
LIC LAND STATISTICS 1987 Table 39 at 60-63 (1988). Competitive leases numbered 890.
Id Table 38 at 58-59.
34. Mineral Leasing Act for Acquired Lands, as amended, 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1982)
and 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1982). The BLM also leases minerals reserved beneath private lands,
30 U.S.C. § 182 (1982) and in any acquired lands. 30 U.S.C. §§ 351-59 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Esdras K. Hartley, 23 IBLA 102 (1975); Earl R. Nilson, 21 IBLA 392 (1975);
and Duncan Miller, 8 IBLA 285 (1972).
36. Mountain States I, 499 F. Supp. at 388-89. BLM regulations reflected this. The
BLM would have the final say but it would include reasonable terms suggested by the Forest
Service. Appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals ("IBLA") or Forest Service could
occur. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.7-4 (1987). The IBLA occasionally modified stipulations in leases
upon appeal. See also 49 Fed. Reg. 37,440 (1984) (interagency agreement gave Forest Serv-
ice primary NEPA responsibility for oil and gas leasing in forests).
37. Mountain States 1, 499 F. Supp. at 388-89.
38. Comment, The Interrelationships of the Mineral Lands Leasing Act the Wilder-
ness Act, and the Endangered Species Act: A Conflict in Search of Resolution, 12 ENVTL
L. 363, 382-84 (1982).
39. Section 5102(d)(1) of the Leasing Reform Act, supra note 26, amending 30 U.S.C.
§ 226 by inserting a new subsection (h). The Act only refers to leases on "National Forest
System Lands reserved from the public domain." Other lands in National Forests are acquired
lands. However, as to those lands, consent was already required. 30 U.S.C. § 352 (1982).
40. Section 5102(d11) of the Leasing Reform Act, supra note 26, amending 30 U.S.C.
§ 226 by inserting a new subsection (h).
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2. Discretionary Nature of a Decision to Lease
The Secretary of the Interior has discretion to not lease lands for oil
and gas exploration. The Secretary may simply decide to withhold lands
from oil and gas leasing." The operative word in the enabling statue is
"may:" "All lands subject to disposition under [the Act] which are known
or believed to contain oil and gas deposits may be leased by the Secre-
tary.' ' 42 The Federal Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act of 1987
did not modify this provision.43 The discretionary wording affects both
initial leasing decisions and subsequent lease development.
The original Mineral Leasing Act enhanced existing Secretarial con-
trol over the resources of the public lands." Prior to the Mineral Land
Leasing Act of 1920, the Secretary could "withdraw ' ' 5 specific lands from
the mining law's applicability."' Massive withdrawals preceded passage
of the Act as the Secretary attempted to place some order on petroleum
development.'" After passage, the Secretary could exercise his discretion-
ary authority to refuse to issue leases by withholding lands from mineral
leasing, either by formal withdrawal,' 8 executive order,'" or regulation.
Decisions on individual lease applications also can effectively declare
specific lands unavailable for leasing.5' An applicant for an oil and gas
lease only receives the right to be treated fairly, not a vested entitlement
41. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965); McDonald v. Clark, 771 F.2d 460, 463 (10th
Cir. 1985) (Secretary may act anytime before a lease is issued even if an offer preceded a
decision not to lease.); cf., McLennan v. Wilbur, 283 U.S. 414, 419 (1931) (Secretary's general
power to protect the public lands supports rejection of all exploration permits).
42. 30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (1982).
43. Leasing Reform Act, supra note 30. But see exclusion of certain lands from leasing
and consent requirement for leases in forests, supra notes 26 and 39.
44. Boesche v. Udall, 373 U.S. 472, 480-83 (1963); see generally Comment, supra note
38, at 364-70.
45. A "withdrawal" is currently defined, inter alia, as:
A withholding ... of Federal land from settlement, sale, location, or entry,
under some or all of the general land laws, for the purpose of limiting activi-
ties under those laws in order to maintain other public values in the area or
reserving the area for a particular public purpose or program ....
43 U.S.C. § 1702 0) (1982). Prior definitions paralleled this. Leshy, supra note 17, at 403 n.21 1.
46. See, e.g., United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469-71 (1915) (implied
executive authority to withdraw); 36 Stat. 847, the "Pickett Act," formerly codified at 43
U.S.C. § 141. Current withdrawal authority is codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1714 (1982), which
repealed prior authority, including implied.
47. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. at 466-68.
48. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. at 6 and 21-22, which also found withdrawal unneces-
sary because of the discretionary nature of leasing. Id. at 20. Mountain States 1, and undoubt-
edly Mountain States II, will be miscited as modifying this authority. They do not do so
substantively, but merely hold that when the BLM's failure to process lease applications
is the equivalent of a withdrawal, then it must follow proper procedures. Mountain States
1, 499 F. Supp. at 395-97; Mountain States II, 668 F. Supp. at 1473-74. For criticisms that
the Wyoming court inaccurately defined a withdrawal, see Bob Marshall Alliance, 852 F.2d
at 1229-30; Leshy supra note 17, at 403 and Comment, supra note 38, at 371 n.58.
49. Learned v. Watt, 528 F. Supp. 980 (D. Wyo. 1981) (Secretarial memorandum).
50. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. at 13-14.
51. Bob Marshall Alliance, 852 F.2d at 1229-30; Cf Chapman v. Sheridan-Wyoming
Coal Co., 338 U.S. 621, 627-28 (1950) (Secretary has a "continuing duty to be governed by
the public interest in deciding to lease or withhold leases.").
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to a lease. Protection of resources other than oil and gas could justify
the decision to not grant a lease,5 because oil and gas leasing need not
dominate public land management. 4
Moreover, if a lease is to be granted, the BLM may insert conditions
in it to protect against degradation of surface or other resources. The
Secretary of the Interior has express authority in the Mineral Leasing
Act to include "provisions . ..for the protection of the interests of
the United States"55 in oil and gas leases. This authority to condition
rights in an oil and gas lease is supplemented by the general implication
that, if an agency has direct discretionary power to grant or not grant
a benefit, then it also may attach specific terms and conditions to the
grant.
56
The passage of NEPA only reinforced this pre-existing ability to dis-
place oil and gas development because of environmental concerns.
Although the EIS requirement of Section 102 of the Act is basically
procedural and does not require an agency to favor the least environmen-
tally disruptive course of action, NEPA has had a substantive impact on
an agency's range of options.57 If an agency ever believed that it had no
mandate to consider environmental concerns as a basis for a decision, that
excuse disappeared with NEPA's enactment. NEPA states that "to the
fullest extent possible... the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with
52. McDonald, 771 F.2d at 463; Arnold v. Morton, 529 F.2d 1101, 1105-06 (9th Cir.
1976) (court cannot order lease issuance even if Secretary erred in rationale for rejecting offer.);
Burglin v. Morton, 527 F.2d 486, 488 (9th Cir. 1975); Duesing v. Udal, 350 F.2d 748, 750-51
(D.C. Cir. 1965) (an application creates no property right that may be "taken" by a refusal
to lease); Mountain States 1, 499 F. Supp. at 396. See generally Laitos and Westfall, Govern-
ment Interference with Private Interests in Public Resources, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1,
18-19 (1987).
53. See, e.g., cases cited supra notes 50 and 51 and Copper Valley Machine Works, Inc.
v. Andrus, 653 F.2d 595, 600 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (authority to regulate for "conservation" in
statute includes protection of all natural resources, not simply oil and gas.).
54. See generally Mansfield, The "Public" in Public Land Appeals: A Case Siudy in
"Reformed"Administrative Law and Proposal for Orderly Participation, 12 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 465 (1988).
55. 30 U.S.C. § 187 (1982). See generally Pring, "Power to Spare": Conditioning Fed-
eral Resource Leases to Protect Socia4 Economic, and Environmental Values, 14 NAT. REs.
LAw 305 (1981).
56. Getty Oil Co. v. Clark, 614 F. Supp. 904, 915-16 (D.C. Wyo. 1985), affd sub noam,
Texaco Producing Inc. v. Hodel, 840 F.2d 776 (10th Cir. 1988). Compare United States v.
Appalachian Electric Power Co., 311 U.S. 377, 424 (1940), which held that because the com-
merce clause enabled the government to exclude all structures on navigable waters, build-
ing could be conditioned upon getting a license, which in turn could contain terms. The
conditions in the license related to the commerce power, but the court continued: "Even if
there were no such relationship the plenary power of Congress over navigable waters would
empower" both a denial of a license or a conditioned license. Id at 426-27. Congress's power
under the property clause has similarly been called "plenary." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl.
2; Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539-40 (1976). But see California Coastal Comm'n
v. Granite Rock Co., 107 S. Ct. 1419 (1987) (some concurrent state jurisdiction).
57. See, e.g., Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Committee, 449 F.2d at 1112. ("It [the Atomic
Energy Commission] is not only permitted, but compelled, to take environmental values into
account. ").
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the policies set forth in" the Act."' Because NEPA declares that "[t]he
policies and goals set forth in [it]... are supplementary to those set forth
in existing authorizations of Federal agencies,"" it empowers agencies
to exercise discretion in favor of the environment.6 1
NEPA authorizes actions to preserve the environment, but its power
has certain limits. NEPA cannot transform a non-discretionary, ministerial
act into one with discretion." For example, if a law mandates a private
property right when someone complies with certain requirements, fears
of environmental degradation cannot undercut the statutory command."
Conversely, if an agency has discretion to set the terms and conditions
of a grant of private rights, NEPA's goals must influence their contents."
Environmental concerns therefore can affect oil and gas lease issuances
in at least two ways: They can support a decision to forego a lease
altogether or modify the terms and conditions of a proposed lease.
In analyzing the bounds of the BLM's authority to regulate oil and
gas development, however, the stage in the process that is at issue
becomes important. At the pre-lease stage, its power is at its apex. The
proprietary power discussed above gives the BLM not only the right to
say "no" to any leasing activity, but also the opportunity to set the terms
on which a private party gains rights to the "property of the United
58. Section 1021l) of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1) (1982). Additionally, it
instructs all agencies to "identify and develop methods and procedures ... which will insure
that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations." Sec-
tion 102(2)(B) of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1982). See also Section 101 (3)
of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4331(B) (1982): "In order to carry out the policy set forth
in this Chapter, it is the continuing responsibility of the Federal Government to use all prac-
ticable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy" to foster
environmental goals.
59. Section 105 of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4335 (1982).
60. E.g., Union Oil Co. of California v. Morton, 512 F.2d 743, 749 (9th Cir. 1975), applying
this conclusion to mineral leasing decisions on the Outer Continental Shelf; Zabel v. Tabb,
430 F.2d 199, 213 (5th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); Public Service Co. of
New Hampshire v. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 582 F.2d 77, 86 (1st Cir.
1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1046 (1978). See generally Tobias and McLean, Of Crabbed
Interpretations and Frustrated Mandates: The Effect of Environmental Policy Acts on Pre-
Existing Agency Authority, 41 MONT. L. RaV. 177 (1980).
61. South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d 1190, 1193 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denie4 449 U.S.
822 (1980); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Berklund, 609 F.2d 553, 558 (D.C.
Cir. 1979).
62. South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d at 1193. Under the Mining Law of 1872, certain
federal lands are "open" to mineral exploration. 30 U.S.C. § 22 (1982). A person discovering
a "valuable mineral deposit" may "locate"- or mark - his or her claim and proceed to develop
it. If the Act's requirements are met, the claimant has a right to receive a "patent," or fee
title to the land. 30 U.S.C. §§ 29, 35-38 (1982). See also 30 U.S.C. § 201(bl (1976), repealed
by the Coal Leasing Amendments Act of 1975, Pub. L. 94-377, § 4,90 Stat. 1083, 1085; Natural
Resources Defense Council Inc., 609 F.2d at 558 (resource conflicts could not justify rejec-
tion of lease applications, but, by considering the costs imposed by environmental statutes
in defining the pre-requisite to lease issuance, Secretary complied with NEPA "to the fullest
extent possible.").
63. Utah International, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 976, 987 (D. Colo. 1980) (even if
an applicant has a vested right to a coal lease, NEPA requires delineation of the terms of
such lease); accord, Utah International, Inc. v. Andrus, 488 F. Supp. 962, 966-67 (D. Utah
1979).
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States.""' With two caveats, the Secretary, and the BLM as his delegate,
has broad discretion on terms to include in a lease. Prohibitions against
"arbitrary and capricious" exercises of authority 5 and contraventions of
direct provisions of the Mineral Leasing Act -which now include Forest
Service rights to object to leases 7 - restrain choices on stipulations.
Nevertheless, whether a lease term could render development impos-
sible has been a controversial proposition.8 One court declared that Con-
gress could not have intended the Secretary to issue mere "shell" leases
with no potential for oil and gas recovery. 8 Other courts have by implica-
tion upheld the Secretary's authority to issue a lease that ultimately may
not be developed.7 0 Practical considerations also indicate that a lease
should be valid even if development might be precluded on particular
lands.
First, the lease's grant of a right to develop hydrocarbon resources
might be satisfied without entry onto the surface of the leased lands. Even
if a lease directly forbids surface occupancy, directional drilling or drainage
from adjacent lands could develop some reservoirs.7 1 Viewed in this light,
a no surface occupancy stipulation is simply a restraint on the manner
of resource recovery, albeit a strict one."7 But the BLM has included terms
64. Cf. Boesche, 373 U.S. at 478-79; Freese v. United States, 639 F.2d 754, 758 (Ct.
Cl. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 827; Freese v. United States, 6 Ct. Cl. 1, affd, 770 F.2d 177
(Fed. Cir. 1985). (As a proprietor, Congress may dictate the terms on which private parties
may initiate rights to the nation's resources.).
65. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982). See also Burglin, 527 F.2d at 489 and Edras K. Hartley,
23 IBLA at 105 (in deciding whether to issue a lease, BLM must examine public interest
and individual facts).
66. Cf FMC Wyoming Corp. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 496, 500-02 (10th Cir. 1987); Coastal
States Energy Co. v. Hodel, 816 F.2d 502, 506-07; and Union Oil Co. of California, 512 F.2d
at 748. See also Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848 F.2d 1068, 1090 (10th Cir. 1988) (at least in some
instances, an affirmative duty to "prevent unnecessary and undue degradation" of public
lands might circumscribe discretion).
67. 30 U.S.C. § 226-3 (1987 Supp.).
68. See, e.g., Leshy, supra note 17, at 412-21; Edelson, supra note 20, at 922-23; and
Noble, supra note 21, at 136-39.
69. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Andrus, 500 F. Supp. 1338, 1345 (D. Wyo.
1980); reversed in part, Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Watt, 696 F.2d 734 (10th Cir.
1982). See Ray and Carver, Section 603 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act:
An Analysis of the BLM's Wilderness Study Process, 21 ARiz. L. Rav. 373 (1979).
70. See, e.g., Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1415; Conner, 848 F.2d at 1449-51. Cf. Rocky Moun-
tain Oil and Gas Ass 'n, 696 F.2d at 745-50 (statutory command to manage wilderness study
areas to not "impair the suitability of such areas for wilderness" enforceable even if it precludes
development); Alaska v. Andrus, 580 F.2d 465, 482-85 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (Secretary could insert
a "termination clause" in an Outer Continental Shelf lease to end it without compensation
if development would pose an unacceptable threat of harm; employed precedents under the
Mineral Leasing Act, e.g., Boesche, 373 U.S. at 476-79) vacated in part and remanded sub
nom Western Oil and Gas Ass'n v. Alaska, 439 U.S. 922 (1978). See generally Comment,
supra note 38, at 425-34.
71. See Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447; Chevron Oil Co., 24 IBLA 159 (1976). This was the
rationale behind the initial, "true" No Surface Occupancy stipulation that directly prohibited
surface use. Comment, Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing on Public Lands: At What point Does
NEPA Require the Preparation of An Environmental Impact Statement?, 25 SAN DIEoo
L. REV. 161, 167 (1988) and Comment, supra note 38, at 411-15.
72. See Max B. Lewis, 56 IBLA 293 (1981) (admonishing the BLM to consider less re-
strictive provisions before imposing NSO stipulations).
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that can metamorphose into a species of a "no surface occupancy" provi-
sion in leases that are not amenable to development by directional drill-
ing or drainage. These stipulations often state that approval of all surface
occupancy is conditioned on the result of subsequent analysis being favor-
able to development. Because surface disturbance is essential to oil and
gas recovery on these leases, this provision essentially defers the deci-
sion as to whether the resource will be exploitable." It does not, however,
render the lease a nullity.
Basic principles of contract and property law explain this conclusion.
The potential lessee is on notice of the stipulation prior to lease issu-
ance.74 The lessee may exercise independent business judgment on the
lease's value. Moreover, if the lessee believes the provision to be unreason-
able, appeal is possible.m Absent appeal and modification, the contrac-
tual term that was accepted with the knowledge of all parties should be
binding as a material part of the lease.7" Additionally, a lease with such
a stipulation is neither meaningless nor valueless. The lessee receives a
property interest that is often the subject of exchange: a preference right
or first option to develop the property should development be deemed pos-
sible.
Those who argue that a provision in a lease that could forbid future
development would equal a "taking" of the lessee's rights" confuse the
Secretary's proprietary power to initially define lease terms with the Secre-
tary's "police power" to regulate development on a lease that has already
been issued. A "taking" of private property may only occur after a pri-
vate property right exists. The development rights granted by the lease
may be limited so that the lease itself defines the boundaries of expecta-
73. Sierra Club, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. at 1453. These stipulations evolved to allow for
completion of forest wilderness studies and preserve highly sensitive environmental areas.
The courts have referred to these "decision-deferring" or "conditional surface occupancy"
stipulations as "No Surface Occupancy" or "NSO" stipulations. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at
1411-12 and Conner, 848 F.2d at 1444. See Edelson, supra note 20, at 924-25. Following the
courts and other commentators, both the "true" prohibitors of surface occupancy and the
"conditional surface occupancy" stipulations, will be termed "NSO" stipulations. See Id
at 925 and Comment, supra note 71, at 167. Compare the expressly named "contingent rights
stipulation" advanced for use on a voluntary basis when the agency was uncertain of the
impacts leasing would create. 47 Fed. Reg. 18,158 (April 28, 1982), discussed in Burton, Federal
Leasing -Restrictions and Extensions, 28 ROCKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 1133, 1139-41 (1983)
and Edelson, supra note 20, at 940-50, and geothermal conditional surface occupancy stipu-
lation, discussed in Union Oil Co. of California 99 IBLA 95, 96-97 (Sept. 17, 1987).
74. Lease terms are available before a lease is signed and, in the competitive realm,
before a lease is offered for bid. See Kenneth W. Bosely, 91 IBLA 172 (Mar. 28, 1986); Robert
LaFaivre, 95 IBLA 26 (Dec. 12, 1986). See also current law requiring public notice of pro-
posed terms, amending 30 U.S.C. § 226 by adding a new subsection (f); 43 C.F.R. § 3102.04,
as amended, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,835 (June 17, 1988).
75. 43 C.F.R. § 3101.7-5 (1987) and amendment at 53 Fed. Reg. 22,835 (June 17, 1988).
For appeal provisions generally, see 43 C.F.R. Part 4 (1987); Mansfield, supra note 54, at
479-88; Burton, supra note 73, at 1144-45.
76. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 77 comment c (1981).
77. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447 n.16; Leshy, supra note 17, at 420-21. Compare descrip-
tion of the rights granted by an Outer Continental Shelf Lease, Secretary of the Interior
v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 317 (1984).
78. Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, 500 F. Supp. at 1345.
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tion.79 Even if the lease does not reserve veto authority, the government
retains a degree of power to regulate drilling activity.
3. Control of Development Post-Lease
A lessee does not receive an unfettered right to develop oil and gas.
Unlike a patent that divests the United States of title to land, an oil and
gas lease grants less than a fee interest and is subject to continuing super-
vision. 0 The Mineral Leasing Act gives broad authority for the regula-
tory control of activities on leases." Regulations applicable to all leases
require advance approval of drilling and other surface-disturbing activi-
ties. The lessee must present an "Application for Permission to Drill"
(APD).8 The BLM or the Forest Service can condition APD approval by
including reasonable requirements to protect the environment."'
The government's ability to control development, like that of the les-
see to gain the benefits of its lease, is not without limits81 Various re-
straints circumscribe the general police power incumbent in land man-
agement duties. These limits on controlling the lessee's activities include
the terms of the lease as a contract, 5 the provisions of the Mineral Leas-
ing Act,8 6 regulatory requirements," and the fifth amendment's proscrip-
79. State of Alaska, 580 F.2d at 484 (no "taking" occurs if a lease term is exercised);
cf Bowen v. Gillard, 107 S. Ct. 3008, 3019 (1987) (inclusion of all family members' incomes
to ascertain eligibility for a benefit not a "taking" because no requirement to grant benefit);
see also Leshy, supra note 17, at 414 n.265 and Comment, supra note 38, at 399-402.
80. Boesche, 373 U.S. at 477-78.
81. 30 U.S.C. § 189 (1982); see McKenna v. Wallis, 344 F.2d 432, 441 (5th Cir. 1965),
vacated on other grounds, 384 U.S. 63, 72 (1966) (authorizes the Secretary "to prescribe rules
and regulations governing in minute detail all facets of the working of the lands leased").
See also new specific directives to both Interior and Forest Service to create regulations
to protect surface resources. Leasing Reform Act, supra note 26, § 5102 (d), amending 30
U.S.C. § 226 by inserting a new subsection (g). Moreover, since 1920, all leases expressly
reserved rights to enact and enforce regulations and, since 1947, "all federal lessees were
accepting a contract that by its own terms was to be governed by future 'regulations' sub-
ject only to the condition that those mandates would be both 'reasonable' and 'not inconsis-
tent with any express and specific provisions' of the lease itself." (footnote omitted). Klein,
Notices to Lessees Under Federal Leases, 25 RocKY MTN. MIN. L. INST. 17-1, 17-5 (1979).
82. 43 C.F.R. §§ 3162.3-1, .3-3, as amended, 53 Fed. Reg. 22,846 (1988). See also Leas-
ing Reform Act, supra note 26, amending 30 U.S.C. § 226 by insertion of a new subsection
(g), which requires approval by the appropriate surface managing agency, thereby giving
authority to the Forest Service when the lands to be disturbed are within its jurisdiction.
83. See authorities cited supra note 82; Copper Valley Machine Works, 653 F.2d at 600;
see also Standard Surface Disturbance Stipulation (Form 3109-5) inserted in nearly all leases,
which subjects all surface disturbing activities to advance approval and reasonable condi-
tions, not inconsistent with the purposes for which the lease is issued (discussed, together
with other common lease terms, in Burton, supra note 73, at 1134-36); see discussion infra
note 235.
84. See generally Laitos and Westfall, supra note 52.
85. Sun Oil Co. v. United States, 572 F.2d 786, 818 (Ct. Cl. 1978); Continental Oil Co.
v. United States, 184 F.2d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 1950).
86. See Copper Valley Machine Works, 653 F.2d at 604-05 (although the BLM could
prevent drilling for six months each year, Mineral Leasing Act § 209 required it to extend
the lease).
87. Union Oil Co. of California, 512 F.2d at 748.
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tion against taking private property without compensation." The prec-
edents that confirm these boundaries do not restrict the BLM's ability
to act pursuant to terms initially included in a lease; in fact, they imply
that the inclusion of the objectionable power in the lease would have
changed the outcome of the cases. 9
Lease issuance, therefore, is a crucial juncture in defining the poten-
tial development of an area for oil and gas recovery. Because the BLM
exercises discretion when it issues a lease, it must comply with NEPA's
procedures. If the grant of a lease is a major federal action significantly
affecting the human environment, an EIS would be required.
III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE HOLDINGS OF THREE CASES
Evaluating NEPA compliance for oil and gas lease issuance presents
a classic NEPA Gordian knot: EIS's must be late enough in a potential
activity's delineation to contain meaningful information, but early enough
in the process so that the EIS can actually influence decisionmaking. 90
An EIS, of course, is only necessary (in the absence of a proposal for legis-
lation) if there is a "proposal" for a "major federal action significantly
affecting the human environment."9 The three cases focus on the term
"proposal," seeking to delineate when an agency actually "proposes"
activity, as well as the "scope" of the particular activity proposed. Two
major analytical frameworks provide methods to approach the problems.
The differences between the two help explain, to a certain extent, the differ-
ing results in the cases.
92
The first approach concentrates on what a federal action authorizes,
and on whether an "irretrievable commitment of resources" results from
88. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Union Oil Co. of California, 512 F.2d at 750-51 (post-lease
regulations that would authorize an indefinite suspension of operations equivalent to lease
cancellation and would be a "taking" if applied to the lease). Compare Gulf Oil Corp. v. Mor-
ton, 493 F.2d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 1973) (same court approved a temporary suspension of
lease operations for a reasonable time).
89. E.g., Continental Oil Co., 184 F.2d at 810 (BLM could not change its royalty calcu-
lation method "in the absence of an express reservation" in the lease); Union Oil Co. of Califor,
nia, 512 F.2d at 749 ("lease may be terminated by its own terms in the event that stated
conditions subsequent occur"). See also Note, Oil and Gas Leasing in Proposed Wilderness
Areas - The Wyoming District Court's Interpretation of Section 603 of the Federal Land
Policy and Management Act, 17 LAND & WATER L. REV. 487, 504 (1984) (criticizing lack
of distinction in treatment of leases based on knowledge of development restrictions at time
of bargaining); Solicitor's Opinion, The Bureau of Land Management Wilderness Review
and Valid Existing Rights (M-36910, supp.), 88 Inter. Dec. 909 (1981) (making such a dis-
tinction in management capabilities), discussed and approved in Sierra Club v. Hodel, 848
F.2d at 1086-87.
90. Scientists' Institute for Public Information, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Commission,
481 F.2d 1079, 1093-94 (D.C. Cir. 1973) [hereinafter SIP1].
91. Section 102(C) of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (C) (1982).
92. On the existence of the two tests, see generally Barney, The Programmatic Environ-
mental Impact Statement and the National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, 16 LAND
& WATER L. REV. 1 (1981) and Hapke, Thomas v. Peterson: The Ninth Circuit Breathes New
Life into CEQ's Cumulative and Connected Actions Regulations, 15 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,289
(1985). See also Fogelman, Threshold Determinations Under The National Environmental
Policy Act, 15 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 59, 69-70 (1987), who identifies a third test: The
"irrational or unwise" test. To this author, this is a component of and method to determine
"independent utility." See standard quoted infra note 132.
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the authorization." Because NEPA directly requires an EIS to analyze
"irretrievable commitments," 94 logic mandates that the EIS precede the
commitment. To a large extent, this orientation enfuses both the Sierra
Club v. Peterson96 and the final Conner97 decisions. To both courts, a lease
itself "commits" lands to oil and gas development unless direct authority
to preclude all future activity is retained. If the lease does not allow the
agency to veto development, an EIS must precede its issuance.
A second line of cases imposes practical limits on an action's dimen-
sions. Although a questioned activity might relate to a larger project, if
it has an "independent utility,"99 it can be analyzed apart from the more
comprehensive scheme. The district court in Conner and both Park County
courts employed this mode of analysis. The results differ in what at first
might seem to be a surprising degree. To the Conner trial judge, a lease
had no utility unless full field development was possible,9 while the Park
County judges found the opposite. °1 They allowed the agencies to separate
impacts of leasing from those of development, but the Conner court viewed
development as part and parcel of the grant of the lease. Because the
independent utility approach is factually oriented, these disparate hold-
ings should not be surprising.'0'
A. Sierra Club v. Peterson
Two sets of leases with different mechanisms to control development
were before the district court in Sierra Club."'0 Some of the leases con-
tained a provision known as a "No Surface Occupancy" stipulation, or
"NSO."" 3 It precludes surface disturbance without subsequent environ-
mental review and reserves the right to forbid surface use- and therefore
development. Another set of leases had no NSO stipulations attached,
although they contained numerous other provisions that detailed controls
retained to protect specific environmental values. 0 4 The circuit court
93. See, e.g., Foundation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 143, 158 (D.C. Cir.
1985) (emphasizing locating an agency's "point of commitment" to a decision), afrg in part,
587 F. Supp. 753 (D.D.C. 1984).
94. Section 102 (C) of NEPA, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982), quoted in text accom-
panying supra note 5.
95. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094; Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1414.
96. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1414.
97. Conner, 848 F. 2d at 1448.
98. First express use in Indian Lookout Alliance v. Volpe, 484 F.2d 11, 19 (8th Cir.1973).
99. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 107. This decision is short and devoid of exposition. Its
author wrote a second decision that provides additional reasoning. Bob Marshall Alliance
v. Watt, 685 F. Supp. 1514 (D.Mont. 1986), affd in part Bob Marshall Alliance, 852 F.2d
1223 (9th Cir. 1988).
100. Park County, 613 F.Supp. at 1188; Park County, 817 F.2d at 622-24.
101. The method originated to analyze how much of a highway to include in an EIS,
but is used for other purposes and, to one commentator, fuels mixed and subjective deci-
sions. Hapke, supra note 92, at 10,290-91.
102. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1411.
103. Id As discussed supra note 73, courts have confused the original terminology applied
to various stipulations. For ease of discussion, the term NSO applies to any stipulation that
either initially precludes or could later "veto" surface disturbance.
104. Id; see also, Id at 1414 n.7; Sierra Club, 17 Evn't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1453.
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decided the question of EIS necessity on the absence or presence of an
NSO provision, but the district court did not make this distinction.
In the initial stage of the case, the leases involved covered 247,000
acres of primitive and roadless lands in the Targhee and Bridger-Teton
National Forests in Idaho and Wyoming.' 05 The region was a "Further
Planning Area" in the Forest Service's RARE II wilderness review pro-
gram, which indicated that wilderness designation was still a possibility.' °0
The Forest Service recommended leasing the entire area and indicated
which stipulations the leases would contain.' °0 It did not prepare an EIS,
but relied upon a "Finding of No Significant Impact" ("FONSI")0
supported by an "Environmental Assessment" ("EA").' Four premises
underlay the FONSI: 1) the leases did not necessarily trigger physical
activity; 2) whether or not development would be desired would be decided
by the lessees at a later date, if ever, and most leases were never devel-
oped; 3) analysis of environmental impacts would occur later if drilling
approval was sought; and 4) the relevant stipulations mitigated the po-
tential for harm."0 The district court accepted the decision's bases for
leases both with and without NSOs.1' The Sierra Club only appealed
the finding that no EIS was necessary for leases without NSO stipula-
tions."1 2
The case squarely questioned what rights a federal oil and gas lease
bestows. The actual granting clause, like that of any private lease, pur-
ports to award the exclusive right to drill for and produce oil and gas,"'
but any offer to lease is subject to the terms and conditions of the lease
105. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1410; Sierra Club, 17 Evn't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1449-50.
106. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1411. Briefly, RARE II was the Forest Service's second
attempt to evaluate its undeveloped lands to ascertain whether to recommend them for inclu-
sion in the wilderness system. Three categories of land resulted: Wilderness, Non-Wilderness,
and Further Planning. In Further Plannning Areas, all resource uses may proceed, so long
as the potential wilderness characteristics of the lands are preserved until completion of a
unit management plan in which wilderness potential would be further analyzed. For more
detailed discussion of the wilderness review process, see Comment, supra note 38, at 385-88.
107. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1411.
108. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.13 (1987). If a FONSI is issued, an action may proceed without
an EIS.
109. An EA provides the record to support an agency's decision not to prepare an EIS
in situations requiring an individual appraisal of the effect of a proposed action. The EA
resembles an EIS and contains its component analyses, but is generally shorter and not sub-
mitted for interagency or public comment. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1501.4 (b), 1508.9 (1987); see also
Sierra Club v. U.S. Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190, 1191-95. (9th Cir. 1988).
110. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1413.
111. Id. at 1414; Sierra Club, 17 Evn't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1453-54.
112. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1412.
113. E.g., standard granting clause for an over-the-counter lease, Form 3110-1 (11th
Edition):
The lessee is granted the exclusive right and privilege to drill for, mine, extract,
remove, and dispose of all the oil and gas deposits, except helium gas, in the
lands leased, together with the right to construct and maintain thereupon, all
works, buildings, . . roads .... pipelines .... or other structures necessary
for the full enjoyment thereof ....
Reproduced in, BLM and Forest Service, NORTH FORK WELL FINAL ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT, p. 90 [hereinafter North Fork Well FEIS].
Vol. XXIV
ONSHORE OIL AND GAS LEASING CONTROVERSY
and relevant statutes and regulations.1 1 4 Despite this qualification, if the
government does not expressly reserve the power to forbid development,
it cannot prevent the exercise of the right to produce oil and gas."' It
could condition the exercise of its grant, delineating the location, timing,
and manner of drilling. Nevertheless, according to the Sierra Club court,
this control could not render the lease undevelopable in either practical
or absolute terms.116
Because the action approved by granting a lease was the potential
drilling the lease authorized, the court found the reasoning of the Forest
Service and BLM faulty. In light of the physical location of the lands in
possible wilderness, significant impacts could occur and the finding to the
contrary was not only unreasonable, but also made without full assess-
ment of possible environmental consequences. The core of the court's opin-
ion is its view that NEPA analysis must precede a decision. To be effective,
it must occur while options are still available, thus prior to any full com-
mitment of resources."7 Although lack of knowledge about how the leases
would be developed makes more comprehensive site-specific analysis
difficult, two-stage evaluation was inappropriate when there was "an
irrevocable commitment to allow some surface disturbing activities, includ-
ing drilling and roadbuilding."" 8 The court emphasized that its decision
applied to the specific 28,000 acres of leased lands before it."9 For them,
it gave an option to the Department of the Interior: it could either 1) defer
analysis by retaining the right to preclude all surface disturbance until
receipt of site-specific development plans together with the authority to
reject proposed activities that would have unacceptable environmental
impacts, or 2) prepare a site-specific EIS prior to lease issuance to analyze
potential developmental impacts.'2 0
B. Conner v. Burford
The Conner v. Burford decision reviewed the status of leases cover-
ing 1,300,000 acres in the Gallatin and Flathead National Forests."' An
EA and FONSI preceded their issuance. The Montana district court
departed from the conclusion of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. It
114. Id. at 89.
115. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1414 n.7.
116. Id. Increasing drilling expense beyond potential cost recovery could also render a
lease undevelopable. See conclusion that requiring helicopter access in one situation would
be tantamout to denying approval to drill, Sierra Club et aL, 80 IBLA 251, 266-67 (May 2,
1984), affd, Texaco Production Co., 840 F. 2d at 776.
117. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1414, citing, inter alia, SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094.
118. Id. at 1414-15 (emphasis in original).
119. While theoretically the proposed two-stage environmental analysis [i.e. of the
leasing decision separated from site-specific drilling] may be acceptable, in this
situation the Department has not complied with NEPA because it has sanc-
tioned activities which have the potential for disturbing the environment
without fully assessing the possible environmental consequences.
Id at 1415.
120. Id The court approved an agreement that added NSO's to the particular leases.
Order of April 11, 1984.
121. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1443.
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required pre-leasing EIS's even when NSO stipulations were present in
leases."' The 9th Circuit Court disagreed with District Court Judge Hat-
field. 2 3 Both approaches deserve examination.
The district court firmly rejected multi-stage NEPA compliance. The
court used the same starting point as did the Sierra Club court: Courts
must ensure that NEPA's mandates are performed at the earliest possi-
ble stage."1' However, rather than concentrating on the legal implications
that arise from lease issuance, the court took a more pragmatic stance.
It asserted that leasing is "the first stage of a number of successive steps
which clearly meet the 'significant effect' criterion to trigger an EIS. "125
If one step proceeds without consideration of "the cumulative effects of
successive, interdependent steps," NEPA is thwarted. 26 The court con-
cluded that future site specific-analyses could not alleviate the problem.
Part of the court's conclusion rested on the BLM's ability to modify
individual NSO stipulations in response to particular development
proposals. It feared that failure to prepare an EIS at that point could result
in piecemeal invasion of the wilderness. 2 Citing California V. Block,"8
which held that the Forest Service could not release lands to non-wilder-
ness activities without analysis at the site-specific level, the Montana dis-
trict court found that "the promise of a site specific EIS in the future
is meaningless if later analysis cannot consider wilderness preservation
as an alternative to development." 29 The court ignored the fact that the
NSO gave the BLM precisely the authority said to be lacking. It could
choose wilderness over development at the later date; the "irretrievable
commitment" did not legally occur.
Focus on a factually based "independent utility" inquiry explains this
oversight. The judge's reasoning is clarified in the Bob Marshall Alliance 30
case. There, the same judge expressed a fundamental belief that a lease
will perforce lead to development. To him, no logic supports a grant of
a lease without the anticipation of development and hence the signing of
the lease is the "critical" decision point: "The first step in the oil and gas
leasing process is obviously the issuance of the leases themselves. It would
undoubtedly be 'irrational, or at least unwise' to undertake a leasing pro-
gram, if exploration and ultimate development were not only contemplated
but possible."'' In essence, he concluded that a lease has no independent
utility and in fact cited cases that determine an agency's ability to
separately analyze parts of phased programs based on whether it would
be meaningless to proceed with the first step without proceeding with the
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1447-49.
124. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 108 (citing 40 C.F.R. § 1501.2 (1987)).
125. Id
126. Id, citing Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d 754, 757 (9th Cir. 1985).
127. Id at 109.
128. 690 F.2d 753, 763 (9th Cir. 1982).
129. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 109 (quoting Block, 690 F.2d at 763).
130. 685 F.Supp. 1514 (D. Mont. 1986).
131. Id at 1519.
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program's latter stages. 32 Additionally, the court viewed any subsequent
multiple oil and gas developments in the area as "cumulative impacts"
of leasing, which raised the impacts of lease issuance to the "significant"
threshold. 3 ' This, too, presumes that development naturally follows any
and all leases. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court in part.'
The appeals court sanctioned grants of NSO leases without an EIS
provided two conditions were met. The NSO term must apply to the entire
leasehold and also must clearly enable the federal government to preclude
surface disturbing activities if subsequent analysis reveals unacceptable
impacts. 35 The "irretrievable commitment" theory breathes life into its
analysis:3 "the sale of an NSO lease cannot be considered the go/no go
point of commitment at which an EIS is required. What the lessee really
acquires is a first right of refusal .... This does not constitute an irretriev-
able commitment of resources. "137 It silenced the district court's fear that
removal of NSO stipulations without an EIS could allow a piecemeal inva-
sion of natural resources. Any modification of lease terms would oblige
the surface management agency to comply with NEPA. At that point,
according to the court, NEPA requires an EIS that examines potential
cumulative impacts. 38
The Ninth Circuit also reviewed the lower court's conclusion that an
EIS must precede the issuance of a lease without an NSO stipulation. The
federal appellants did not question the requirement for leases in "road-
less" areas, but did challenge the ruling as applied to leases in "roaded"
areas. The two types of lands differ because the "roadless" areas involved
remained eligible for possible future inclusion in the wilderness system,
but the "roaded" areas were never considered for wilderness designation.
3 9
The Ninth Circuit rejected the distinction because "nothing in the record"
supported a conclusion that impacts to the roaded areas would be less
132. Id. The court quoted Thomas, 753 F.2d at 759 as follows:
In Trout Unlimited v. Morton, 509 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1974), we addressed
the issue of when subsequent phases of development must be covered in an
environmental impact statement on the first phase. We stated an EIS must
cover subsequent stages when the 'dependency is such that it would be irra-
tional, or at least unwise, to undertake the first phase if subsequent phases
were not also undertaken.'
Jd at 1285. Compare CEQ definition of "connected actions," which must be considered in
an EIS. 40 C.F.R. §1508.25(a)(1) (1987).
133. Bob Marshall Alliance, 685 F.Supp. at 1519-20. Decisions on whether to prepare
an EIS are called "threshold determinations" because they ascertain the reach of NEPA's
procedural mandate. See generally Fogelman, supra note 92. Because NEPA only directly
requires an EIS, a "threshold determination" of a FONSI therefore exempts an action from
NEPA's direct procedural dictates. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1982).
134. Conner, 848 F. 2d at 1441. See also Bob Marshall Alliance, 852 F.2d at 1223.
135. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447 n.15.
136. Id. at 1447-49.
137. Id. at 1448. Recognizing the lessee's "first refusal" rights also acknowledges that
an NSO lease has "independent utility."
138. Id The court is correct that allowance of surface disturbance requires NEPA com-
pliance because discretion is involved. However, its presumption that an EIS will always
be necessary is not accurate. See infra text accompanying notes 237-61.
139. Id at 1445 n.11; see also definition of "wilderness," 16 U.S.C. § 1311 (1982), dis-
cussed supra note 18.
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severe.14 0 It then concurred with Sierra Club v. Peterson, holding that the
issuance of a non-NSO lease was the "point of commitment" to oil and
gas development activity because it foreclosed the option of "no action"
in response to future developmental requests.""
The appellants had further argued that other lease stipulations in non-
NSO leases mitigated the potential for harm from future activities to the
point that their impacts would not be significant, hence obviating the need
for an EIS."2 Because some development would be allowed, however, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the argument. Moreover, it made some factual
"findings:"
[I]t is also clear that those activities are likely, if not certain, to
significantly affect the environment .... We understand that the
mitigation stipulations enable the government to regulate many
of the adverse environmental impacts of oil and gas activities. We
seriously question, however, whether the ability to subject such
highly intrusive activities to reasonable regulation can reduce their
effects to insignificance. NEPA does not require that mitigation
measures completely compensate for the adverse effects of post-
leasing oil and gas activities ... but an EIS must be prepared
as long as "substantial questions" remain as to whether the meas-
ures will completely preclude significant environmental effects....
Thus, even if there is a chance that regulation of surface-disturbing
activities will render insignificant the impacts of those activities,
that possibility does not dispel substantial questions regarding
the government's ability to adequately regulate activities which
it cannot absolutely preclude 43
These reservations about the efficacy of mitigation parallelled those found
in Sierra Club v. Peterson. 14 The Tenth Circuit also considered the issue
in Park County, but in a different factual setting.14
5
140. Id at 1448, n.17, which reads in pertinent part:
[All appellants argue that oil and gas development and production will have
comparatively little impact on roaded areas. However, we find nothing in the
record to show that the mere fact that a parcel of national forest land is "roaded"
renders the environmental impact [of] oil and gas activities insignificant....
The EAs do not attempt to distinguish roaded land as significantly less affected
by oil and gas development and production than roadless areas.... Since we
find nothing in the record to support appellants' position, we reject the sug-
gestion that our analysis should treat roaded areas differently from roadless
areas.
141. Id at 1451.
142. Id at 1450. As discussed supra text accompanying note 139, the federal agencies
limited this argument to leases in roaded areas. For leasing in roadless areas, they were prepar-
ing an EIS. Id at 1445 n.11.
143. Id at 1450. For descriptions of possible impacts from prospecting, exploring, develop.
ing and producing, see North Fork Well FEIS, Appendix E; Edelson, supra note 20, at 912-14;
Noble, supra note 21, at 120-30. The court's hesitancy to endorse mitigation may be tied
to its belief that no lease provision could operate unless it was "reasonable" -meaning not
destructive of the right to drill. This reading fails to acknowledge that specific provisions
of the lease can impose duties on lessees even if they preclude mineral development, so long
as other resource concerns make the provisions "reasonable." See infra note 235.
144. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1411, 1414 cited in Conner, 848 F.2d at 1449.
145. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
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C. Park County Resources Council v. Department of Agriculture
Park County contrasts with the other cases in several material aspects.
First - and of primary importance - it reviewed a single lease of 10,174
acres of Forest Service land.'4 Secondly, no conflict with wilderness desig-
nation existed. Not only were none of the lands being studied for wilder-
ness, in 1984 the Wyoming Wilderness Act classified the affected environs
as multiple-use areas.147 Finally, the controversy arose almost three years
after the lease's effective date. In the interim, the lessee sought approval
for an exploratory well and an E IS was written analyzing its impacts. 4
The factual and procedural differences between Park County and both
Sierra Club and Conner explain the disparate substantive results.
Additionally, the procedural status of the case allowed the Tenth Cir-
cuit to set administrative law precedents favorable to environmental
activists. In both Conner and Sierra Club, the plaintiffs challenged the
leases pursuant to agency administrative processes before the leases
issued and promptly sought judicial review.49 Therefore, the propriety
of court intervention was not questioned because of timeliness or exhaus-
tion concerns. 5 ' However, the defendants in Park County pursued, and
the District Court upheld, arguments based on laches and exhaustion as
well as a statute of limitations found in the Mineral Leasing Act.'
The Tenth Circuit disagreed, and allowed plaintiffs to allege that a
violation of NEPA should invalidate the lease despite the time lapse. On
the statute of limitations issue, the court found that Congress appended
no limitation period to NEPA. To use varying statutes of limitations
applicable to reviews under diverse statutory schemes would be incon-
gruous. To it, NEPA imposes obligations outside of and supplemental to
duties under the Mineral Leasing Act."' Laches, therefore, would be the
traditional and only time-control of NEPA actions.
The Tenth Circuit's rejection of the laches defense, being factually
oriented, does not result in significant precedential impact."'1 Although
146. Id. at 612.
147. Park County, 817 F.2d at 612 n.1 (quoting Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1187).
148. See Park County, 817 F.2d at 612-13; North Fork Well FEIS.
149. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1444; Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1412.
150. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1444, but see Sierra Club, 17 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) at 1451-52,
where the court rejected Interior's attempt to separate the supplemental pleading by which
it was brought into the case from a timely complaint for purposes of determining compli-
ance with the statute of limitations. Other procedural questions on whether lessees were
indispensable parties to the proceedings were decided favorably for environmentalists in Con-
ner, 848 F.2d at 1458-62. For similar arguments, see National Wildlife Federation v. Bur-
ford, 835 F.2d 305, 315-16, 332-33 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
151. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1982); Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1185-86.
152. Park County, 817 F.2d at 616-17; but see Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 709 F.2d
1310, 1311 (9th Cir. 1983); Forelaws on Board v. Johnson, 743 F.2d 677, 686 n.6 (9th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 478 U.S. 1009 (1986); and the legislative history of the Mineral Leasing
Act provision, which emphasized Congressional intent to provide lessees with secure title
and to "remove a potential cloud on acreage subject to leasing" S. Rep. No. 1549, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5 (1960). This distinguishes leasing from the situations in the cases relied upon by
the Tenth Circuit.
153. Park County, 817 F.2d at 618-19.
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the use of exhaustion doctrine to bar judicial review is similarly a discre-
tionary act based on factual analysis, two points made by the court bear
discussion.
The Tenth Circuit's treatment of the issue indicates that the doctrine
will have little or no applicability in NEPA challenges to BLM activities.
Requiring exhaustion of remedies is often premised on allowing an agency
to employ its expertise in an administrative setting.'5 Here, the court
broadly stated that agencies have no particular expertise on NEPA.
Courts would be as well-suited as an agency to settle the issue of EIS
necessity.'55 The court's finding that "deference to agency expertise is
inapplicable in the NEPA context""' contradicts the circuit's standard
of review of threshold determinations, which instructs judges to ascer-
tain whether a FONSI is "within the bounds of reasoned decisionmak-
ing."157
Additionally, the court refused to require administrative redress of
the alleged harm because no forum was currently available to review the
decision since more than thirty days had elapsed after lease issuance.'58
The court implied that if a plaintiff allows a statute of limitations for
administrative review to run, a court action could never be subject to an
exhaustion defense. 159 These procedural rulings could theoretically allow
NEPA challenges to any and all existent oil and gas leases. 16 0 The Court's
154. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 194-95 (1969); see generally Gelpe, Exhaus-
tion of Administrative Remedies: Lessons from Environmental Cases, 53 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 1, 16-20 (1984-85).
155. Park County, 817 F.2d at 619-20.
156. Id at 620. It explains its statement by saying that no one agency has particular
NEPA expertise.
157. Id at 622, quoting Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105 (1983). This case generally is viewed as granting great deference
to agencies. See Siegel, The Aftermath of Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. NRDC: A Broader
Notion of JudicialDeference to Agency Expertise, 11 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 331 (1987). The
Ninth and Tenth Circuits test a FONSI by a "reasonableness" standard. E.g., Park County,
817 F.2d at 621 n.4 and Conner, 848 F.2d at 1446. Judicial intervention under this test differs
from a court's ability to overturn an "arbitrary and capricious" exercise of agency discre-
tion because to not prepare an EIS when needed would embroil the agency in an action
"without observance of procedure required by law," which triggers a separate standard of
review. Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1282. Nevertheless, because NEPA does not explicitly
define the EIS trigger, agency decisions on the act's implementation receive some defer-
ence. E.g., Park County, 817 F.2d at 621 ("It is the agency's responsibility to initially deter-
mine the need for an EIS.").
158. Park County, 817 F.2d at 619-20. Initial BLM decisions may be appealed within
thirty days to the Interior Board of Land Appeals. 43 C.F.R. § 4.411 (1988). It may review
the sufficiency of NEPA compliance underlying a decision and has overruled BLM actions
on this ground. E.g., State of Wyoming Game and Fish Commission, 91 IBLA 364 (Apr.
24, 1986); Glacier-Two Medicine Alliance, 88 IBLA 133 (Aug. 9, 1985); and In Re Upper Flores
Timber Sale, 86 IBLA 296 (May 13, 1985).
159. See comment on this holding, to wit, that to "adopt[ I ... the view that exhaustion
is excused whenever parties let the time for administrative review expire [would be] a propo-
sition as novel as it would be destructive." National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d
305, 332 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Williams, J., dissenting). See generally Gelpe, supra note 154, at 35.
160. The court did dismiss the plaintiffs' challenge to the approval of the exploratory
well as moot. The well - a dry hole - had already been completed. Park County, 817 F.2d
at 614-15. Because the lease continued to exist and could be the basis of additional develop-
mental proposals, the question of its validity was not moot. Id.
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ruling on the merits of the case does not make this a hollow victory for
environmentalists, regardless of initial impressions of the substantive
result.
The Tenth Circuit did hold that a lease had been issued validly despite
the fact that no EIS preceded its grant. This holding must be placed in
context. The plaintiffs had broadly asserted that "issuance of such a lease
[for oil and gas on national forest land] always constitutes a major fed-
eral action significantly affecting the quality of the human environ-
ment. " 61 This was the position of the District Court in the Conner case,
16 2
which had not yet been partially overruled by the Ninth Circuit. Even
with the partial reversal of Conner, however, the situation before the Tenth
Circuit would initially appear to require an EIS under the final Conner
and Sierra Club rationales: The lease did not contain an NSO lease stipu-
lation. Many other stipulations existed to control and regulate develop-
ment, but, unless endangered or threatened species were adversely
affected, the BLM could not veto all surface disturbance. " Nevertheless,
the Tenth Circuit approved a FONSI based on the Forest Service's EA
for oil and gas leasing in the Shoshone Forest.
The court endorsed the concept that agency decisionmaking should
proceed reasonably by incremental steps.164 It identified leasing as the
first step in the oil and gas recovery scenario. The court examined the
EA, which appraised the impacts of leasing itself, not possible future drill-
ing. The document considered alternatives, such as leasing with and
without various stipulations or not leasing at all. The court's description
of the EA continues:
It examines the potential effects of each of these alternatives on
energy use and conservation, on national forest administration,
and, as its name indicates, on the environment. It concludes that
"[olil and gas lease issuance, as such, creates no environmental
impacts. The imposition of appropriate stipulatory controls for
operations subsequent to lease issuance can, in most cases, pre-
vent or satisfactorily mitigate unacceptable environmental
impacts." Consequently, the Forest Service's announced preferred
alternative is to recommend lease issuance with appropriate stipu-
lations. The EA specifically notes that prior to any drilling
activity, the need for a site-specific, much more comprehensive
EIS must be examined. (citations omitted).16 5
161. Id. at 620.
162. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 109.
163. Compare description of lease in Park County, 817 F.2d at 613 with description of
non-NSO leases in Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1411, nn.4-5; and Conner, 848 F.2d at 1444, 1449-50.
164. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624, refers to the "tiered approach to environmental
review." The court misconstrued the cited CEQ regulation by ignoring guidelines on when
it is to be used and simply concentrating on the purpose of tiering - "to focus on the issues
which are ripe for decision and exclude from consideration issues already decided or not yet
ripe." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1987). See Comment, supra note 71, at 184-86.
165. Park County, 817 F.2d at 612.
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Despite its holding that agencies have no particular expertise in NEPA,
the court reviewed the EA under the reasonableness standard and found
it within the bounds of agency discretion to conclude that lease issuance,
with appropriate stipulations, would be an "essentially paper transaction"
that would not significantly affect the environment."6 Two rationales for
the decision are directly apparent.
First, the court acknowledged that the lessee did not receive carte
blanche developmental rights. Its oil and gas activities would be subject
to the requirements of the stipulations appended to the leases. These would
mitigate impacts, arguably below the threshold that would trigger an EIS,
that is, below significance.'67 More importantly, subsequent development
would require further analysis. To the court, the agency had not yet relin-
quished all the necessary "strings" precedent to development.'
The facts of the case undoubtedly bolstered a belief that subsequent
review of proposed drilling activity can provide meaningful environmen-
tal protection: "an EIS was prepared prior to the exploratory drilling at
the North Fork Well.' 6 ' The EIS was before the court. It examined not
only the drillsite, but a study area of 39,000 acres. Drilling access was
limited to helicopters. The agencies researched environmental concerns
and consulted extensively. After analysis, the BLM approved the well,
but only with mitigation measures not originally in the company pro-
posal.'70 At least in this instance, the District Court for Montana's cyn-
icism as to the possibilities of subsequent meaningful agency compliance
with NEPA was undeserved. 7'
In its second reason for approval of the FONSI, the Tenth Circuit used
the "independent utility" justification. The plaintiffs argued that to only
consider impacts from leasing would be an improper segmentation of
agency action; a proper definition of the "action" would encompass the
eventual cumulative and foreseeable effects of exploratory drilling as well
as full field development. " 2 However, based on the low incidence of
166. Id at 621.
167. Id at 621-22.
168. Id at 622. The court analogizes to patenting a mining claim, which was the subject
of South Dakota v. Andrus, 614 F.2d at 1190. As discussed supra note 62, a decision to grant
a mineral lease is qualitatively different from a decision to grant a fee patent under the Min-
ing Law; the latter is fundamentally a ministerial action if the private party fulfills certain
prerequisites, while decisions under the Mineral Leasing Act present the BLM with a wide
array of usable terms and conditions. An unqualified analogy is decidedly erroneous. However,
the Tenth Circuit possibly desired to concentrate on the second reason the South Dakota
court employed to justify not requiring an EIS at patent issuance, namely, that further
approvals and analysis would precede actual mining. Id at 1194.
169. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
170. Id at 613. See also Park County, 613 F.Supp. at 1187-88 and the North Fork Well
FEIS. Compare the 9th Circuit's approval of a brief and "inadequate" discussion of mitiga-
tion when subsequent site-specific actions displayed environmental sensitivity, Sierra Club
v. Clark, 774 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir. 1985).
171. See Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 109. Moreover, the requirement of helicopter access
belied the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that a non-NSO oil and gas lease always authorized road
building. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1414.
172. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
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development on noncompetitive oil and gas leases, the court found it irra-
tional to attempt meaningful analysis of full field development at such
an early stage.' The effects could not be deemed "reasonably- foresee-
able." Leasing and full field development are not so interdependent that
it would be irrational to proceed with the first step without considering
the latter."4
Pragmatic concerns drove the court's reasoning. Because of the sheer
number of leases issued, an EIS requirement would overwhelm the agency
while the unavailability of concrete development information would
produce EIS's with only speculative data. 7 5 In fact, the EIS for the APD
did contain an overview of impacts from a generic full field. The District
Court queried whether anything more informative could be prepared
without further information.7 1
The Tenth Circuit treated the issue of when full field development
should be considered in an EIS as a matter of timing. Because the impacts
would eventually be addressed in an E IS, the court allowed the precise
moment of analysis to be deferred if the agency presented a "rational
basis" for its timing choice. 77 Here, the court concurred that awaiting
a concrete proposal for further development provided such a rationale.
Again, the particular facts of the case undoubtedly influenced the con-
clusion. The well drilled at the North Fork site did not trigger production
or an urgent drive towards full field development. The well was dry and
the site abandoned. 178 Park County presented a rare situation. A compre-
hensive EIS examined a low-impact well and an "affected environment"
of 39,000 acres. The well turned out to be dry. No more fortuitious set
of facts could be found for developers. 79
The three cases examined what NEPA requires an agency to consider
when granting private rights to develop public resources. They focus on
173. Id at 623.
174. Id
175. Id. at 623-24.
176. Park County, 613 F.Supp. at 1188. The first draft EIS for the North Fork well did
attempt to analyze impacts of various levels of full field development. Reaction to the draft
was critical. Many commented that they could not comprehend what the proposed action
was. BLM AND FOREST SERVICE, NORTH FORK WELL SECOND DRAFT ENVIRONMEN-
TAL IMPACT STATEMENT, 65 (Sept. 1984) [hereinafter North Fork Well DEIS II]. The
second draft EIS concentrated on alternatives to the single exploratory well with an appen-
dix on development and production of the exploratory well and the area. i at 113-20. See
also NORTH FORK WELL FEIS 8-9, 123-30.
177. Park County, 817 F.2d at 624 n.5. This review was more deferential than that
employed generally for a FONSI. Compare Second Circuit's belief that even if one aspect
of a project proceeds to an "irreversible" commitment, a separate EIS on a latter stage could
still consider and ameliorate environmental concerns in that stage. Hudson River Sloop Clear-
water v. Dep't of Navy, 836 F.2d 760 (2nd Cir. 1988).
178. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614.
179. No national environmental group was a plaintiff in Park County, although some
participated in the other two cases. The facts of Park County might have restrained suit
by "habituds." In fact, an attorney for the Sierra Club Legal Defense Counsel, speaking in
her personal capacity, stated that she would not have brought the action. K. Sheldon, Speech
to the Mineral Law Section of the Colorado Bar Association (May 6, 1988). The absence of
experienced counsel also might have led to less than perfect representation for the environ-
mental viewpoint. See Comment, supra note 71, at 187-88.
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two potentially disparate concerns: what is factually likely and what is
legally permitted to occur as a result of the grant. Although the holding
of Park County appears to contradict the final decisions in the other two
cases, the three are reconcilable. Viewed in proper context, moreover, the
reconciled holdings are in full conformity with NEPA and may provide
useful guidance that will enhance environmental protection.
IV. LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR A PARADIGM OF COMPLIANCE
A cursory reading of Sierra Club, Conner, and Park County creates
a serious misapprehension, namely, that the extensive litigation has left
the BLM and Forest Service no closer to knowing how to proceed than
they were in 1981. This need not be true. Although to a large extent the
cases are dependent on facts peculiar to them, analysis of how the facts
diverge leads to a coherent framework which recognizes that absolute
requirements are the exception, not the rule, under NEPA.
A. A Reconciliation of Holdings
In two respects, the holdings of Sierra Club and Conner appear to con-
tradict those of Park County. The former cases refused to approve issu-
ance of an oil and gas lease without an EIS unless the BLM retained the
right to veto all future surface disturbance;"10 Park County approved a
FONSI and subsequent issuance of a lease without this safeguard.1' Addi-
tionally, the Conner court implied that an analysis of the impacts of the
first surface disturbance should include not only the activity for which
direct approval was requested, but also consider the impacts of full field
development.182 The Park County court, in contrast, found a NEPA docu-
ment adequate when it only analyzed the impacts of the individual well
requested in a drilling proposal.183 The differing factual contexts of the
decisions, however, explain the disparate conclusions.
The Sierra Club decision involved a large roadless region, the Palisades
Further Planning Area, which was required to be managed to preserve
its current wilderness attributes pending intensive review. 8 Any activi-
tiy could impact wilderness characteristics and these effects are difficult,
although not impossible, to categorize as "insignificant.""18 The Sierra Club
court itself acknowledged that, in some circumstances, a two-stage envir-
onmental analysis that separates leasing impacts from those flowing from
development might be appropriate. iM The situation before it, however, was
not such an instance.
180. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1412-15; Conner, 848 F.2d at 1449-51.
181. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622-24.
182. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1448.
183. Park County, 613 F.Supp. at 1188, see also Park County, 817 F.2d at 622-24.
184. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1411, n.l.
185. Compare Leshy, supra note 17, at 379 (courts have developed almost a per se rule
requiring an EIS when proposed federal action threatens an area's wilderness characteris-
tics) and Edelson, supra note 20, at 912-14 (oil and gas development is incompatible with
wilderness); with Cabinet Mountains Wilderness v. Peterson, 685 F.2d 678, 681-84 (D.C. Cir.
1982) (A 36-hole exploratory drilling program in a designated wilderness was sufficiently
mitigated so as to not require an EIS before approval.).
186. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1415.
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In the Ninth Circuit case, the federal defendants made specific argu-
ments for two-stage impact analysis when "roaded" lands were at issue. 1
7
Although the court in Conner rejected the argument, it indicated that this
result was based on the inadequacy of the evidence to support disparate
treatment simply because lands were classified as either "roaded" or
'roadless." 188 The record was similarly devoid of information about how
mitigation measures could avoid subsequent impacts in the absence of
an NSO stipulation. Although the court acknowledged that "NEPA does
not require that mitigation measures completely compensate for the
adverse environmental effects of post-leasing oil and gas activities, ' 181 the
record left it unassured that the regulatory measures and stipulations
would preclude significant environmental impacts.1 90
The Park County court, however, examined a different record applied
to specific "roaded" lands. The District Court described the leased area
as not only non-wilderness, but also "not pristine, or primitive, or even
very unusual." 9 ' Both it and the Court of Appeals described the EA for
leasing the lands as being a document that examined alternatives and
chose one that would sufficiently control any impacts that might result
from leasing. 191 This implied the agencies actually looked at specific lands,
applied the alternative proposed stipulations to their resources, and con-
cluded in the EA that any remaining impacts from foreseeable develop-
ment were insignificant. 9 ' The EA at issue, however, broadly examined
the impacts of leasing over an entire forest region. 94 Local offices of the
Forest Service applied general standards derived from the EA to recom-
mend specific lease terms without formally doing an EA.19' "Tiering," a
process of going from a broad environmental document to a more specific
document, is an allowable procedure,'96 but the Forest Service should have
187. Conner, 848 F. 2d at 1448, n.17 and 1445, n.ll.
188. Id. at 1448, n.17; see supra note 140 for quote in full.
189. Id at 1450.
190. Id.
191. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1187.
192. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622-23.
193. Cf the D.C. Circuit's test for upholding a FONSI. A court must ascertain:
(1) whether the agency took a "hard look" at the problem; (2) whether the agency
identified the relevant areas of environmental concern; (3) as to the problems
studied and identified, whether the agency made a convincing case that the
impact was insignificant; and (4) if there was impact of true significance, whether
the agency convincingly established that changes in the project sufficiently
reduced it to a minimum.
Cabinet Mountains Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682. The Tenth Circuit does not articulate these
particular steps, but requires that an agency take a "hard look" at environmental concerns
and be "reasonable" in its conclusions. See, e.g., Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
194. It was to be used for 17.4 million acres and the actual analysis comprised 14 pages;
the remaining 86 pages were exhibits of stipulations and pre-existing guidelines. FOREST
SERVICE, DEP'T OF AGRIC., ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT ON FOREST SERVICE
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONSENT FOR OIL AND GAS LEASE ISSUANCE,
NATIONAL FOREST SYSTEM LANDS, COLORADO, WYOMING, KANSAS,
NEBRASKA, AND SOUTH DAKOTA (1979); described in Nelson, supra note 17, at 5 and
Comment, supra note 38, at 435-36.
195. Comment, supra note 38, at 435-36.
196. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28 (1987). For a discussion of typical problems arising from tier-
ing, see Hapke, supra note 92, at 10,289.
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made a formal record of its analysis of particular lands before lease issu-
ance. The subsequent EIS, which did specifically study impacts of the
drilling proposal on 39,000 acres,"97 perhaps merged with the EA in the
judges' minds and influenced the reviewing courts.
The apparent conflict over issuance of a non-NSO lease without an
EIS may be resolved as a difference based on factual proof. Although the
lands affected by the drilling in Park County were multiple use lands and
not wilderness lands, 98 land classification alone did not dictate the result.
Wilderness lands arguably are more sensitive to any impact by man, but
it is possible to design activities within wilderness areas that will not sig-
nificantly impact the human environment. 99 Conversely, some actions on
non-wilderness lands can trigger significant impacts. The crucial element
of the Park County decision was that the EA - if it actually had been as
described - would have examined particular lands and particular mitiga-
tion measures. A site-specific EA may indicate the absence of significant
impacts.
The second perceived conflict is more problematical: how much future
oil and gas activity must be considered in the initial evaluation of impacts?
Park County approaches the level to which analysis of potential activity
must be taken flexibly. In some situations, enough may be known about
potential activities so that full-field development must be addressed when
analyzing a particular well 209 - or even before leasing. 201 However, the anal-
ysis need not occur at the same time in all instances and could be deferred
if information on potential drilling was too speculative .2 2 The Conner and
Sierra Club decisions react differently to forecasting difficulties.
Both courts suggest that the proper response to uncertainty about
future drilling plans is to reserve the right to preclude all development.2 "3
Moreover, both cases imply that effects from developing the leased area
fully for oil and gas recovery must be a necessary component of any
appraisal of the first agency action that allows any surface disturbance.
Specifically, the Conner decision maintains that "government evaluation
of surface-disturbing activity on NSO leases must include consideration
of the potential for further connected development and cumulative impacts
from all oil and gas development activities pursuant to the federal
leases.""2 " (emphasis added). The court's use of the word "potential,"
however, indicates that full field development might not be presumed
likely in all instances. Indeed, the cases and regulations cited for includ-
ing more than one specific activity at once use a reasonableness test to
197. North Fork Well FEIS, at 53-72 (Chapter II, Affected Environment).
198. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622.
199. Cabinet Mountain Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 681-84.
200. Park County, 817 F.2d at 623.
201. See Id at 624 n.5 (Court implies that an EIS might be required "at the leasing
stage" if "firm plans to develop" exist.).
202. Id. at 624.
203. Sierra Club, 717 F.2d at 1415, quoted in Conner, 848 F.2d at 1451.
204. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1448. See also definition of oil and gas activities as "all activi-
ties undertaken by oil and gas lessees, including exploration, development, production, and
abandonment." Id. at 1444, n.5.
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delineate the extent to which additional potential activities must enter
into an initial analysis. 05 Determinations of "reasonableness" require fac-
tual examinations.
Park County reviewed a particular scenario and held "that, in this case,
developmental plans [for additional wells and region-wide development]
were not concrete enough at the leasing stage to require such an
inquiry." 06 The district court found that information was still insufficient
to trigger a concrete analysis of full development when the first well was
proposed. Possible consequences of future development were not totally
ignored, however, because the EIS for the well did examine a generic oil
and gas field.2 0 7 Specific factual records aid in bringing the seemingly dis-
cordant pronouncements into harmony.
Combining the three holdings and the three factual records reveals
a rule of reason. NEPA requires different levels of analysis based on what
actions are foreseeable and what physical surroundings are impacted. The
actual resources present on lands determine whether lease stipulations
other than NSO provisions may sufficiently reduce impacts so that no
EIS would be necessary before leasing. On some lands, any development
at all would perforce include significant impacts to the human environ-
ment. Other lands may contain different non-oil and gas resources so that
controls on drilling and other activities could avoid significant adverse
impacts. Similarily, no pervasive rule of law governs what activities need
to be considered in assessing the effectiveness of the proposed lease stipu-
lations. Facts about an area's geology and a company's existing plans to
develop oil and gas resources may influence this decision. This fact-
dependent approach is a reaffirmation of NEPA's purpose and is not con-
trary to case law that arose in contexts other than federal onshore oil and
gas leasing.
B. Case Holdings in Context of Existent NEPA Interpretation
The following discussion places the reconciled holdings in context.
Three questions will guide the summary:
1) When does a "proposal" for agency action exist?
2) What role does mitigation play in assessing impacts?
3) What is the "scope" of the necessary analysis if an "action" is found
to exist?
Because at least one court questioned the appropriateness of using an NSO
stipulation to defer an EIS, each question will examine both NSO and
non-NSO leases. To a large extent, these questions all consider how an
agency should cope with uncertainty.
205. Id at 1448. The court cited Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d at 757-61 and CEQ regu-
lations at 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7, 1508.8, 1508.25(a)(1) and 1508.25(a)(2) (1985).
206. Park County, 817 F.2d at 623. The court relied on one of the same regulations as
did the Conner court, namely, 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7.
207. Park County, 613 F. Supp. at 1188. The sufficiency of the EIS for the North Fork
well was moot on appeal. Park County, 817 F.2d at 614.
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1. Prerequisites of a "Proposal"
In all three cases, a primary argument against a pre-lease or other
early appraisal of the effects of oil and gas development was that impacts
could not be addressed meaningfully without knowing how, when, or even
if the lessees would proceed. 08 However, uncertainty about future events 0 9
is never a carte blanche excuse to avoid NEPA's dictates. NEPA always
requires some degree of forecasting.10 A method is needed to distinguish
when a possible future activity is sufficiently definite to have become a
"proposal" for action.
An early case approached the temporal dilemma in defining a
"proposal" by examining four factors:
1) The likelihood that the program (or larger activity) will actually
be developed;
2) The extent information exists currently on the environmental
effects of proceeding with a program;
3) The extent to which irretrievable commitments have been made
and other options thereby precluded; and
4) The severity of the impacts that would result from implementing
the program.1
Although this analytical framework focuses attention on important issues,
the Supreme Court firmly rejected its judicial use: "A court has no
authority to depart from the statutory language and, by a balancing of
court-devised factors, determine a point.., at which an impact statement
should be prepared.""' Agency "contemplation" of action is insufficient
to trigger an EIS; there must be a "proposed action. "213
208. Conner, 848 F.2d at 1450-51; Park County, 817 F.2d at 623-24; and Sierra Club,
717 F.2d at 1415.
209. This situation differs from one in which there is scientific uncertainty as to potential
significant adverse affects. What is missing here is not the ability to analyze impacts from
developmental activities, but certainty about whether any exploration or production will
occur on a particular tract. North Fork Well FEIS, at 53. "Worst case analysis" should not
be an issue. See 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1985) and current regulation, 40 C.F.R. §1502.22 (1987);
Methow Valley Citizens Council Regional Foresters, 833 F.2d 810, 817-18 (9th Cir. 1987)
cert. granted sub nom. Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 108 S. Ct. 2869 (1988);
and Note, FederalAgency Treatment of Uncertainty in Environmental Impact Statements
Under the CEQ's AmendedNEPA Regulation § 1502.22: Worst Case Analysis or Risk Thres-
hold?, 86 MiCH. L. REv. 777 (1988). Nevertheless, some might insist that there is "incomplete
or unavailable information." However, the problem with grafting CEQ "incomplete and
unavailable information" procedures onto the leasing process is that they apply when "evalu-
ating reasonably foreseeable significant adverse effects." 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (1987). One
comes full circle: The missing information is what determines whether impacts are foreseeable.
210. Cf. Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1280 (9th Cir. 1973)
("If we were to impose a requirement that an impact statement can never be prepared until
all relevant environmental effects were known, it is doubtful that any project could ever be
initiated.").
211. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094-98.
212. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 406. The D.C. Circuit decision below had expressly
employed the SIPI test. Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 879-83 (D.C. Cir. 1975). For
the Supreme Court's description of the test, see Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 404-05.
213. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 401. See also the Supreme Court's somewhat
cryptic pronouncement that cumulative impacts only need be considered when concrete
"proposals" are before an agency. Id at 401 n.12; Weinberger v. Catholic Action, 454 U.S.
139, 146 (1981), quoted in Park County, 817 F.2d at 623.
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Despite this pithy directive, the Supreme Court failed to precisely
define when a "proposal" comes into existence. The CEQ regulations
attempt guidance: a proposal exists when an agency has a goal and is
actively moving toward a decision on one or more ways to accomplish the
goal and the effects of these methods can be evaluated meaningfully.
21
"
Additionally, CEQ's comments to the definition provide that a proposal
should not be deemed present at a point too early in the planning process
to make adequate analysis possible.1 5 This elaboration reflects the
Supreme Court's practical concern. To have a proposal for an "action,"
it required a concrete plan of activity. Otherwise, there would be nothing
to analyze except "estimates of potential development and attendant
environmental consequences."1 6 The five components of an EIS would
have no grounding in fact.2 1 7 This emphasis on practicality does not com-
pletely resolve the problem of when a proposal might exist. Additionally,
it does not delineate fully the "scope"" 8 of necessary analysis if a proposal
for action exists.
One test that attempts to resolve both issues is the "irretrievable com-
mitment" approach, which looks for the point at which the agency can
no longer deny an action.1 9 Precedents employing this concept clearly indi-
cate that the three circuits were in the mainstream when they held that
an oil and gas lease issued with a NSO stipulation is not equivalent to
a "proposal" for full development of the leased area for oil and gas recov-
ery. First, actual drilling and other activities were never "proposed" in
the common meaning of the term because no concrete plan for resource
recovery with specific well-sites existed at lease issuance. Moreover,
despite arguments derived from the basic policies of the Mineral Leasing
Act,220 a lease grant in itself does not represent a definite goal to develop
the land either from the government's or the lessee's perspective.
214. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.23 (1987).
215. Comment 2 to § 1508.22, 43 Fed. Reg. 55,989 (1978) (§ 1508.22 to be renumbered
§ 1508.23).
216. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 402.
217. Id at 401-02. For a listing of the five factors, see supra text accompanying note 5.
218. "Scope" is "the range of actions, alternatives, and impacts to be considered in an
environmental impact statement." 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25 (1987). Although it technically refers
to what must be in an EIS, in common usage the "scope of the action" before an agency
is said to include the same elements.
219. Foundation of Economic Trends, 756 F.2d at 158. (The "point of commitment" is
crucial to the existence of a "proposal;" a policy position that simply allows for a grant or
denial of activity in the future on a case-by-case basis would be but a "decision deferred.");
see Note, Environmental Review of Recombinant DNA Experiments Under NEPA: Foun-
dation on Economic Trends v. Heckler, 21 UNIV. S.F.L. REV. 501 (1987) (at least an EA needed
at policy adoption stage because some potential for people to avail themselves of the newly
created authority must have existed or the policy revision was meaningless). See also Sierra
Club v. Hathaway, 579 F.2d 1162, 1167-68 (9th Cir. 1978); SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094.
220. E.g., Rocky Mountain Oil and Gas Association, 500 F. Supp. at 1345 (To issue an
oil and gas lease without contemplating development "is clearly contrary to Congressional
intent.., of mineral production."); and Nelson, supra note 17, at 23 (An oil and gas lease
represents a "plan" for development.). For a summary of arguments for a dominant federal
mineral estate, see Brooks, Multiple Use Versus Dominant Use: Can Federal Land Use Plan-
ning Fulfill the Principles of Multiple Use for Mineral Development?, 33 RocKY MTN. MIN.
L. INST. 1-1, 1-9 - 1-19 (1987).
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The Mineral Leasing Act authorizes leasing of lands that are merely
"believed" to contain oil and gas.12 1 No party guarantees resource produc-
tion, nor are lessees subject to any censure if they do not produce.2 2 The
lease will expire eventually absent production, but oil and gas companies
routinely acquire more acreage than they produce to await future trends.
2
1
Most importantly, with an NSO stipulation inserted, the BLM has not
assented yet to any surface disturbance. The physical status quo remains
unchanged.2 Although a lease without an NSO stipulation also does not
directly authorize drilling, whether the control retained in it is sufficient
to negate any potential for significant impacts requires further analysis.
2. Mitigation's Role in Ascertaining Impacts
An NSO stipulation, by precluding any surface-disturbing activities
unless approved, in essence mitigates2 5 any future adverse effect lease
issuance could trigger. The court's sanction of NSO stipulations, as well
as less restrictive lease stipulations designed to temper environmental
impacts, indicates their approval of mitigation as a proper technique to
eliminate or postpone the need for an EIS.
The CEQ, in advice to agencies entitled "Forty Most Asked Questions
Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy Act Regulations, "2 2 6
attempted to limit the practice. It required that the specific means
employed to compensate for impacts be an inherent part of either the
proposal or the agency's enabling authority:
Mitigation measures may be relied upon to make a finding of no
significant impact only if they are imposed by statute or regula-
tion, or submitted by an applicant or agency as part of the origi-
nal proposal. As a general rule, the regulations contemplate that
agencies should use a broad approach in defining significance and
221. 30 U.S.C. § 226(a) (1982).
222. Compare 30 U.S.C. § 226(e) (1982), which merely provides that, absent special cir-
cumstances, an oil and gas lease expires without production at the end of its primary term
with strict "diligent development" requirements for coal leases, Id. at 207(b), 201(a)(2) (1982
& Supp. 1985). But see, National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 758-59 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) (Even coal lease development is speculative.). See also Comment, supra note 31
(Lessee might have little invested in lease acquisition.).
223. A high percentage of non-competitive federal leases are never drilled. Park County,
817 F.2d at 623.
224. But see discussion of developmental pressures if lease is issued, infra note 275. For
cases holding that no EIS is required if the physical status quo is unchanged, see Sierra
Club v. F.E.R.C., 754 F.2d 1506 (9th Cir. 1985); Burbank Anti-Noise Group v. Goldschmidt,
623 F.2d 115 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981); and Committee for Auto Respon-
sibility v. Solomon, 603 F.2d 992,1001-03 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 915 (1980).
Compare controversy over inaction as action, Sierra Club, 848 F.2d at 1089; Defenders of
Wildlife v. Andrus, 627 F.2d 1238 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Alaska v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 537 (9th Cir.
1979); and Note, Does NEPA Require an Impact Statement on Inaction, 81 MIcH. L. REV.
1337 (1983).
225. The CEQ definition of mitigation includes "[a]voiding the impact altogether." 40
C.F.R. § 1508.20 (1987).
226. Forty Most Asked Questions Concerning CEQ's National Environmental Policy
Act Regulations, 46 Fed. Reg. 18,026 (1981) [hereinafter Forty Questions].
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should not rely on the possibility of mitigation as an excuse to
avoid the EIS requirement.22
7
In the cases, the stipulations attached to the leases modified the basic
lease and emerged from the EA process for use in the leasing option. No
regulation or statute directly mandates the inclusion of any particular
stipulation in a lease.
2
1
The courts' approval of any lease stipulation to eliminate the need for
an EIS accords with general NEPA case law.2 2 9 In fact, the fourth criterion
of the D.C. Circuit's FONSI review standard incorporates this technique:
It directs a court to ascertain "whether the agency convincingly estab-
lished that changes in the project sufficiently reduced ... [an impact of
true significance] to a minimum. '"2 30 Two rationales support the use of miti-
gation measures in this manner. First, it enables agencies to conserve
financial and technical resources and apply the EIS process to truly sig-
nificant problems.2"' Secondly, more environmentally sound actions
emerge from the process as agencies seek ways to minimize harm. 232 Before
lease stipulations may act as mitigation, however, there are two prereq-
uisites: They must be enforceable and effective.233
For a stipulation to be enforceable, applicable law must authorize its
implementation. The BLM may delineate precisely the rights contained
227. Id at 18,038 (Question 40).
228. But see Leasing Reform Act, supra note 26, amending 30 U.S.C. § 226 by adding
a new subsection (g), which requires the Secretary of the Interior or the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, in regard to Forest Service lands, to "regulate all surface-disturbing activities conducted
pursuant to any lease issued... and... determine reclamation and other actions as required
in the interest of conservation of surface resources." Enforcement should be effective; the
BLM must deny any new oil and gas leases or approval of assignments of existing leases
to anyone who has failed or refused "in any material respect" to comply with a reclamation
requirement or other standard established pursuant to this power. Id.
229. See, e.g., C.A.R.E. Now, Inc. v. F.A.A., 844 F. 2d 1569, 1575 (1lth Cir. 1988); and
Cabinet Mountain Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 681-83. See generally Fogelman, supra note 92,
at 99-102; and Glitzenstein, Project Modification: Illegitimate Circumvention of the EIS
Requirement or Desirable Means to Reduce Adverse Impacts, 10 ECOL L.Q. 253 (1982). But
see Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d 868 (1st Cir. 1985) (rejecting a FONSI based on the Forty
Questions restriction.).
230. Cabinet Mountain Wilderness, 685 F.2d at 682.
231. Id
232. Herson, Project Mitigation Revisite& Most Courts Approve Findings of No Sig-
nificant Impact Justified by Mitigation, 13 EcoL L.Q. 51, 70-72 (1986) (additionally suggests
circulation of mitigation reliant EA's for public and inter-agency input) Forty Questions also
recommends this procedure. Supra note 226, at 18,038 (Question 40). But see Note, A New
Approach to Review of NEPA Findings of No Significant Impacts, 85 MicH. L. REv. 152,
197-98 (1986) (An EA and EIS provide very different signals to the public; the former implies
that the agency's action is environmentally sound and that the public need not take a vigilant
stance.).
233. Nelson, supra note 17, at 16-21. A third requirement, that the agency will actually
implement them, is also relevant. Because of the presumption of regularity applied to agency
action, it is difficult to initially challenge the usefulness of stipulations on this ground. Edelson,
supra note 20, at 921-22; Conner, 848 F.2d at 1448. See also Conservation Law Foundation
of New England, Inc. v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712, 715 (1st Cir. 1979) (Presume Secretary will
act lawfully.). Compare, assertion that for an EIS to adequately disclose impacts of an action,
mitigation measures must be developed and analyzed in advance. Methow Valley Citizens
Counci 833 F.2d at 819-20, cert granted.
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in a lease because of its proprietary power. 234 Authority therefore exists
to include the most stringent of stipulations - the NSO stipulation."5 The
government may also impose lesser restrictions, such as requiring specific
development techniques or limiting the use of the surface to particular
areas or seasons.
In addition to being enforceable, stipulations must be effective, that
is, they must in actuality prevent significant impacts. The NSO clearly
eliminates all impacts. None can occur until each and every surface-
disturbance is approved after subsequent analysis."' Whether less res-
trictive stipulations are effective would require examination of the
resources - such as wildlife, streams, and vegetation - of particular lands
to identify what development could affect. The stipulations would then
have to protect the identified values and reduce any unavoidable impacts
to insignificance. Naturally, the difficulty or ease of reaching this result
would vary dependent on the scope of the action that the stipulations must
control.
3. Precedents on "Cumulative" and "Interconnected" Actions
The reconciled holdings of the three cases contain a flexible approach
to the question of whether, in assessing a particular action's impacts, the
agency must consider full oil and gas development of the area or some
lesser level of activity. Evaluation of this result necessitates review of
234. Congress recently reaffirmed that more than mineral development must be consi-
dered in exercising authority under the Mineral Leasing Act. Leasing Reform Act, supra
note 26, § 5102 (d) (1) discussed supra note 228. Arguably, another directive of this section
could transform all leases into NSO leases: "No permit to drill on an oil and gas lease...
may be granted without the analysis and approval by the Secretary concerned [i.e., Interior
or Agriculture] of a plan of operations covering proposed surface-drilling activities within
the lease area." However, another provision requires public notice of specific lease terms
prior to offering lands for lease. Id, amending 30 U.S.C. § 226 by adding a new subsection
(f). This implies discretion in setting lease terms, including whether or not a lease should
contain an NSO stipulation.
235. See discussion accompanying and authorities cited notes 55-67 supra. The court
in Conner asked whether an NSO's authorization to veto activity survives the Standard Oil
and Gas Stipulation, which subjects all surface disturbance "[to] such reasonable conditions,
not inconsistent with the purposes for which this lease is issued, as the Superviser [now the
Authorized Officer of the BLM or Forest Service] may require to protect the surface of the
leased lands and the environment." Conner, 848 F.2d at 1447, n.15 (emphasis in original).
The answer is yes. The "standard stipulation" is a catch-all provision, alerting the lessee
that all rights to develop are regulated. By nature, as its name implies, it is a general provi-
sion. If inconsistencies exist between general and more specific terms in an agreement, the
more specific provisions prevail. WILLISTON, ON CONTRACTS, §§ 619 and 624 (3rd ed. 1979),
RESTATEMENT 2ND OF CONTRACTS, § 229 (c) (1973). Moreover, grants of public lands are con-
strued in favor of the government. Watt v. Western Nuclear Inc., 462 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1983);
Adams v. United States, 687 F. Supp. 1479, 1490 (D. Nev. 1988). See also 43 C.F.R. 3101.1-2
and 3101.1-3, as amended, 53 Fed. Reg. 17,351 (May 16, 1988) and 22,835 {June 17, 1988)
(specific lease stipulations control).
236. Cf LaFlamme v. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 842 F.2d 1063, 1071 (9th
Cir. 1988), which required an explanation of how mitigation methods would lessen impacts
and forbid reliance on future studies. The agency, however, had only retained the right to
make reasonable changes in the stream flow after the studies. Id at 1067. See also Methow
Valley Citizens Counci4 833 F.2d at 819-20.
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related analyses, namely, court treatment of "the scope of an action" and
the additional need to evaluate "cumulative impacts '227 and "indirect
effects. "238
A second test for delineating a "proposal" emphasizes the practical,
rather than legal, implications of an action. Courts may limit an action's
scope when its "independent utility" appears to sever it from a larger
scheme.219 Conversely, CEQ requires "connected actions" to be analyzed
together. A "connected" action includes those which automatically trig-
ger other actions, which cannot or will not proceed without other actions,
or which "are interdependent parts of a larger action and depend on the
larger action for their justification.'"240 The last element of the definition
coincides with pre-existing tests that precluded a finding of "independent
utility.""" Major cases employing this analytical technique support the
propriety of the combined holdings.
Courts have refused to sever activities when the contours of the larger
plan are known to a reasonable extent. For example, if an overall alloca-
tion of a resource has been made, then an EIS must analyze the impact
of this dedication, even if the precise impacts of any sub-allocation are
still unknown .2 2 When future development of an area is logically required
to satisfy contractual commitments or justify a large upfront capital
investment, an EIS cannot examine just an initial plan; it would be irra-
tional to conclude that the remainder of a known resource would not be
developed.2 2 Similarily, if additional activities under the control of the
agency are the sole or major justification for the initial action, any analy-
sis of its impacts must include those of the actions to follow.2 14 The deci-
sion to grant an oil and gas lease differs substantively from other actions
that were found to be connected to subsequent activity.
Key points of the linking rationales are missing from the leasing situ-
ation. These include the elements of 1) agency initiative, 2) firm alloca-
tion, and 3) predictable development. After the agency issues an oil and
gas lease, it will not originate developmental proposals. These will emanate
from the lessee, if at all. The lease, moreover, is not a complete allocation
237. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1987).
238. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.8(b) (1987). "Effects" and "impacts" are synonymous. Id.
239. See discussion at and authorities cited in note 98 supra.
240. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.25(a)(1) (1987). For a discussion of the concept in relation to oil
and gas drilling, see Glacier-Two Medicine Alliance, 88 IBLA at 144-47 (production from
well usually within scope of drilling proposal because drilling has no independent utility apart
from production).
241. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., 836 F.2d at 764.
242. Environmental Defense Fund v. Andrus, 596 F.2d 848, 851-53 (9th Cir. 1979) (analyze
overall plan for putting 832,000 acre-feet of project water to industrial uses even if all end
uses uncertain).
243. Methow Valley Citizens Council 833 F.2d at 816-17 (Ski area will lead to residen-
tial construction.); Cady v. Morton, 527 F.2d 786, 795 (9th Cir. 1975) (EIS on 770-acre coal
mine plan insufficient to support issuance of lease of over 30,000 acres of coal when lessee
had contracted to supply large amounts of coal for 20 years and would need to extend mine.)
244. Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d at 757 (proposal to build road for access to timber
harvest area cannot be severed from planned timber sales); Hudson River Sloop Clearwater,
Inc., 836 F.2d at 763 (because the Navy would proceed with first project even without fam-
ily housing facilities, the latter not connected to the first).
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of the embraced lands to the recovery of oil and gas at the preclusion of
other uses. Even in the absence of an NSO stipulation, the government
may control development to coordinate with other users and protect other
resources." 5 In contrast to coal reserves, whether sufficient oil or gas exists
to justify development is unknown for most potential lease tracts, espe-
cially those which used to be leased non-competitively.2 48 Full scale oil and
gas activity does not necessarily follow lease issuance. The precedents
do not preclude finding a limited scope for the leasing decision.
Other case law, which allowed severance of impact analysis, also indi-
cates that, at least in some instances, leasing impacts may be separated
from those of development. Independent utility does not only result from
finding that an action serves a function of its own, but relates to whether
the decision point for later activity has passed. An action may be indepen-
dent if subsequent stages have not been and need not be approved.
4 7
Therefore, if the initial action does not provide permission to change the
status quo, impact analysis may be deferred until the grant of the requi-
site precondition. 48 If the agency may at a later date preclude the actual
action that might be damaging, or if it will have the opportunity to miti-
gate its effects, then the scope of the initial action will not include the
latter.248 The overriding theme of these decisions permitting severance of
245. See, e.g., Copper Valley Machine Works Inc., 653 F.2d at 604-05 (BLM can preclude
drilling for six months of each year to preserve tundra.; and "Limited Surface Use Stipula-
tion," which covered nearly all of the lease in Park County and provided that oil and gas
activities during specified times would be controlled to protect big game habitat and recrea-
tional use. North Fork Well FEIS, at 94; Noble, supra note 21, at 135. But see Comment,
NEPA Compliance in Oil and Gas Leasing: Leasehold Segmentation and the Decision to
Forego an Environmental Statemen 58 U. COLo. L. REv. 677, 689-91 (1988) (Concludes that
a lease is a total commitment to resource development and thus the act of issuing one is
"vertically" connected to future development.)
246. See notes 30-33, supra. Prior to drilling, geologists are only correct 15% of the time
in their predictions of a site's worth for development. Hapke, supra note 92, at 10,294 n.71.
Even after seismic investigation, success probabilities are still low. Noble, supra note 21,
at 121 n.31.
247. Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc., 836 F.2d. at 763 (shore facility); Trout
Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1285 (Teton Dam and Reservoir) and Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d
788, 793 (10th Cir. 1974) (Strawberry Irrigation System).
248. Sierra Club v. F.E.R.C., 754 F.2d at 1509 (preliminary permit allowed no activity
on the land); Columbia Basin Land Protection Assn. v. Schlesinger, 643 F.2d 585, 597 (9th
Cir. 1981) (powerline grant, not mere access agreement, should trigger EIS); cf, Secretary
of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. at 335-43 (drilling, not issuance of an off-shore lease,
"directly affects" a coastal zone); C.A.R.E. Now, Inc., 844 F. 2d at 1573-74 (if the subject
action will not cause the activity in question, it is not connected to the action).
249. Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 614 (9th Cir. 1984), affd Village of
False Pass v. Watt, 505 F. Supp. 1123 (D. Alaska 1983) (because offshore leasing statute
allows preclusion of exploration, can defer worst case analysis of spills); County of Suffolk
v. Andrus, 562 F.2d 1368, 1382 (2nd Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1064 (1978) (EIS on
proposed offshore lease sufficient without pipeline analysis); Colorado River Conservancy
District v. U.S., 593 F.2d 907,910 (10th Cir. 1977) (if Secretary could cancel water contracts
after analysis, impacts of later use need not be analyzed at signing); cf., National Wildlife
Federation v. Hodel, 839 F.2d 694, 726 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (phased reclamation bonding meets
statute's goals); Secretary of Interior, 464 U.S. at 342-43; North Slope Borough v. Andrus,
486 F. Supp. 326, 329, affd in part, 642 F.2d 589, 607-11 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (lease issuance
not a jeopardizing action if may stop later development); but see Conner, 848 F.2d at 1451-58
(rejecting this last holding for leases issued under the onshore Mineral Leasing Act).
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activities is whether the agency retained authority to reject or substan-
tially modify later stages of a project.
Control placed on subsequent oil and gas development activities in
a lease can provide this cleansing safeguard. An NSO provision meets the
criteria for impact severance because the agency may separately evalu-
ate and reject each stage of surface occupancy. Other mitigation measures
included in leases may also be sufficient to limit the action's scope. Such
a conclusion, however, will require analysis of the physical resources of
a particular area.
Nevertheless, even if lease issuance is not necessarily "connected" to
development, another hurdle exists: CEQ regulations also demand con-
sideration of "cumulative impacts." A "cumulative impact" is one which
"results from the incremental impact of the action when added to other
past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future actions regardless of what
agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such actions.
Cumulative impacts can result from individually minor but collectively
significant actions over a period of time." (emphasis added).25"
Such impacts enter into an assessment of an action's "significance."
The agency must consider "[wihether the action is related to other actions
with individually insignificant but cumulatively significant impacts. Sig-
nificance exists if it is reasonable to anticipate a cumulatively significant
impact on the environment. Significance cannot be avoided by terming
an action temporary or by breaking it down into small component parts."
(emphasis added)."' Concentration on whether full-field development is
a "cumulative impact" of the leasing decision can avoid some of the legalis-
tic line drawing prevalent in efforts to delineate an action's scope by the
irretrievable commitment and independent utility methods. 252
Under this requirement, the potential future action - or actual past
activity - that must be included does not have to be "connected" to the
subject proposal, but merely have the potential to increase or affect the
nature of the proposal's impacts.2 5 Geographic proximity may suffice. 54
The definition of a "cumulative impact," however, as well as its role in
ascertaining "significance," turns upon the "reasonableness" of anticipat-
250. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.7 (1987).
251. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.27 (b) (7) (1987).
252. See generally Hapke, supra note 92. Fogelman, supra note 92, at 72-77 calls these
analyses "CEQ tests."
253. Sierra Club v. Forest Service, 843 F.2d 1190, 1194-95 (9th Cir. 1988); Save the Yaak
Committee v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 720-21 (9th Cir. 1988), Big Hole Ranches Association,
Inc. v. U.S. Forest Service, 686 F. Supp. 256, 261-63 (D. Mont. 1988); Oregon Natural
Resources Council 832 F.2d at 1497-98 (Corps of Engineers must take into account existent
dams in basin; "[t]he synergistic impact of the project should be taken into account at some
stage, and certainly before the last dam is completed"); but see C.A.R.E., Now, Inc., 844
F.2d 1569, 1574-75 (limits the definition of cumulative impacts to those directly or indirectly
caused by the action under analysis).
254. See acknowledgment by the Supreme Court that, in some instances, cumulative
impacts from activities geographically near one another will necessitate a comprehensive
EIS, Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 409-10.
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ing future activity. 55 This requires individual factual inquiry. In some
cases, evidence will be overwhelming. Future actions would be reasonably
certain when an agency has planned them,256 when parties are heading
towards a defined goal,2 57 or when an agency has clear knowledge of
resource availability and development needs. 25 8 Oil and gas leasing does
not always present any of these situations. Room for individual appraisal
exists.
The combined holdings on the breadth of necessary analysis are not
contrary to law. Nevertheless, the Park County court could have erred
as greatly in one direction as the Conner district court did in the oppo-
site. Although the Tenth Circuit said it was only ruling on the need for
full-field analysis in the particular case before it, 59 figures on the low prob-
ability of development of federal leases in general apparently influenced
it."2' Conversely, the court in Conner, when considering cumulative
impacts, indiscriminately presumed all leases contained the same inevita-
ble developmental potential. 61 In a paradigm of proper NEPA compliance,
agencies would avoid both extremes.
V. CONCLUSION: IDENTIFICATION OF A PARADIGM
To DIRECT NEPA COMPLIANCE
To simply reconcile the holdings of the three cases and place them
in perspective does not create a framework for meaningful NEPA anal-
ysis. Any suggested solution must foster NEPA's primary purpose, which
255. 40 C.F.R. §§ 1508.7 and 1508.27(b)(7) (1987).
256. Save the Yaak Committee, 840 F.2d at 720-21; Thomas v. Peterson, 753 F.2d at
755 (future timber sales are "cumulative impacts" and not speculative when EA's on the
sales were prepared immediately after the questioned EA covering a road's construction).
Cf City of Davis v. Coleman, 521 F.2d 661, 676 (9th Cir. 1975) (when justification for high-
way interchange is future development, must include same in analysis).
257. Sierra Club v. Marsh, 769 F.2d at 878-80 (industrial park must be included in anal-
ysis of causeway and port when plans for it exist); Conservation Society of Southern Ver-
mont, Inc. v. Secretary of Transportation, 508 F.2d 927, 934-36 (2nd Cir. 1974) (avowed desire
of three states to convert route to an expressway necessitated cumulative analysis); Oregon
Natural Resources Council, 832 F.2d at 1497 (existent dams in area).
258. Cady, 527 F.2d at 795 clearly expresses the rationale: "[Ilt can not be denied that
the environmental consequences of several [coal] strip mining projects extending over twenty
years or more within a tract of 30,876.45 acres will be significantly different from those which
accompany Westmoreland's activities on a single tract of 770 acres." See also Methow Val-
ley Citizens Council, 833 F.2d at 816-17 cert. granted (residential development logical exten-
sion of planned recreation facility); and LaFlamme, 842 F.2d at 1072-73 (development in river
basin foreseeable).
259. Park County, 817 F.2d at 622-23.
260. Id. at 623:
Full field development is typically an extremely tentative possibility at best
at the leasing stage. Because 'exploration activities are conducted on only about
one of ten federal leases issued and development activities are conducted on
only one of ten of those leases on which exploration activities have been
approved and completed'. . .
261. Conner, 605 F. Supp. at 109 ("Obviously a comprehensive analysis of cumulative
impacts of several oil and gas activities must be done before a single activity can proceed.");
see also Bob Marshall Alliance, 685 F. Supp. at 1519, (Quotes without qualification the Cady
conclusion on coal development, supra note 258.) For a similar emphasis on a basin-wide
impact of a discovery of oil or gas, see Comment, supra note 245, at 694-95.
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is to improve decisionmaking. 26 1 Its disclosure provisions not only force
agencies to grapple with often-neglected environmental concerns,6 3 but
also provide opponents of actions with information on potential adverse
effects for use in the political arena. 64 But if NEPA's provisions merely
thwart and hogtie agency programs without an attendant increase in con-
structive information, no one will gain. The proposed procedure must
balance an agency's need to implement its substantive duties with
NEPA's charge to prevent damage to the environment by blind decision-
making.
Before describing any improved process, NEPA's goals should be more
closely scrutinized. Congress, in imposing NEPA's decisionmaking duty
on federal agencies, perhaps did not anticipate the almost all-pervasive
influence of its procedures. They have caused beneficial changes in fed-
eral decisions, " 5 but much agency expertise is expended in fulfilling
NEPA's directives. 2 6 An EIS may take twelve months or more to com-
plete" 7 and can cost $350,000 or more.26 " Because Congress did not appro-
priate any additional funds for agencies concurrently with NEPA's
passage, it might not have intended such expenses.2 69 Even if a Congres-
sional backlash because of costs does not occur in regard to oil and gas
leasing, courts also attempt to place boundaries on burdensome NEPA
262. See generally Dreyfus and Ingram, The National Environmental Policy Act A View
of Intent and Practice, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 243, 254 (1976) and Tarlock, Balancing Environ-
mental Consideration and Energy Demands: A Comment on Calvert Cliffs Coordinating Com-
mittee v. AEC, 47 IND. L.J. 644, 661-67 (1972).
263. E.g., Oregon Natural Resources Counci 832 F.2d at 1492; Silva v. Lynn, 482 F.2d
1282, 1285 (1st Cir. 1973) ("[H]elps insure the integrity of the process of decision by precluding
stubborn problems or serious criticism from being swept under the rug."); N.R.D.C., Inc.
v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827, 833 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (EIS is "environmental source material" for
the Executive, Congress, and public.); and Trout Unlimited, 509 F.2d at 1283.
264. Therefore, an allegation by an affiant that an agency failed to prepare an EIS pro-
vides an "injury in fact" sufficient to grant standing. National Wildlife Federation v. Hodel,
839 F.2d at 712. See also Andrews, Agency Responses to NEPA: A Comparison and Impli-
cations, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 301, 321 (1976) and Friesma and Culhane, Social Impacts,
Policy, and the Environmental Impact Statement, 16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 339, 340 (1976).
265. See Hammond, Embedding Policy Statements in Statutes: Perspectives on the Gen-
esis of a new Public Law Jurispudence, 5 HASTINGS INT'L. & COMP. L.J. 323, 345-48 (1982),
(Astute judges used NEPA's procedural provisions to coalesce vague policy provisions.).
For summaries of critical evaluations, see Murchinson, Does NEPA Matter? An Analysis
of the Historical Development and Contemporary Significance of the National Environmen-
tal Policy Act, 18 U. RICH. L. REV. 557 (1984) and Gray, supra note 4, at 369-78. For a view
of the BLM see ENVIRONMENTAL LAW INSTITUTE, NEPA IN ACTION: ENVIRONMEN-
TAL OFFICES IN NINETEEN FEDERAL AGENCIES, 176-205 (1981).
266. Cf Wichelman, Administrative Agency Implementation of the National Environ-
mental Policy Act of 1969: A Conceptual Framework for Explaining Differential Responses,
16 NAT. RESOURCES J. 263 (1976) (decisions improve with additional expertise).
267. Forty Questions, supra note 226, at 18,077 (Question 35) estimated twelve months.
However, the EIS process for the North Fork well began in August of 1983 with a Notice
of Intent to prepare an EIS. The agencies released the final EIS in March of 1985 and granted
the APD May 5, 1985.
268. Estimate contained in Edelson, supra note 20, at 944 n.206, where he argues that
because an EIS can analyze several leases for this expense and it costs approximately $200,000
to perform a seismic survey for one lease, it would be more economical to conduct pre-leasing
EIS's. This reasoning, however, presumes that all leases will have expensive exploratory work.
269. Dreyfus and Ingram, supra note 262, at 256, 260-61.
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compliance and any paradigm to improve the process must address the
courts' concerns.
Two basic premises fuel judicial desires to moderate over-reliance on
expensive EIS's. The first is to avoid a "trivialization" of NEPA. NEPA
requires an E IS only when significant results are likely to occur. To con-
centrate resources on an EIS when such impacts are unlikely would divert
attention from actions that truly require analysis.2 0 The second motiva-
tion involves the fear that if NE PA procedures are grafted onto indefinite
or abstract activities, NEPA would founder like Antaeus removed from
contact with the earth. Only theoretical estimates of potential impacts
from differing levels of activity will result. No analysis of specific impacts
from alternative actions could emerge to point towards appropriate meas-
ures to avoid potential harm. 71 NEPA requires a grounding in physical
reality. Forced to undertake unstructured analysis, agencies may balk,
turn to boilerplate language, and eventually grow numb to NEPA's use-
fulness in more appropriate situations.
Park County is sensitive to some of these problems,272 but the court
was perhaps too eager to embrace broadly worded pragmatic arguments.
The sheer number and cost of potential EIS's do not justify judicial erasure
of NEPA from the statute books.27 Nevertheless, ignoring the limited
nature of agency resources and using the EIS process as an unyielding
roadblock will not increase environmentally sensitive decisionmaking.
Over the long run, environmentalists must factor bureaucratic reality into
their strategy. 7 4 The goal must be marshalling agency attention to avoid
unwitting loss of irreplaceable natural treasures while allowing actions
of lesser impact to proceed with proper regulatory oversight preventing
unnecessary damage.
The combined holdings grant the necessary tools for responsible
agency action. They provide five major options:
1. A pre-leasing EIS analyzing the impacts of leasing only;
270. E.g., Cabinet Mountain Wilderness Association, 685 F.2d at 682 (in the context
of a "mitigated" action); Isaak Walton League of America v. Marsh, 655 F.2d 346, 377 (D.C.
Cir. 1981), cert. denied sub. nora, Atcheson, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Marsh, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981) (an impact found to be highly unlikely); Sierra Club v. Andrus, 442 U.S.
at 358 (response to allegation that all appropriation requests required an EIS).
271. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 401-02. A close look at the affected environment,
an important section of any EIS, could alert agencies to potential conflicts. The result of
the conflict, nevertheless, would be unclear until the contours of an activity are known.
272. Park County, 817 F.2d at 623-24.
273. Perhaps the most famous and analogous situation involved the Forest Service's
decision to simultaneously allocate millions of acres to non-wilderness use. The court responded
that the agency "may not rely upon forecasting difficulties or the task's magnitude to excuse
the absence of a reasonably thorough site-specific analysis .... " California v. Block, 690
F.2d at 765. For other cases not excusing compliance due to cost or lack of manpower, see,
e.g., N.R.D.C., Inc. v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 829, 840-41 (D.C.D.C. 1974), affda 527 F.2d 1386
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 913 (1976) and Conservation Society of Southern Vermont,
933 F.2d at 932 n.24.
274. Rogers, supra note 16. See also, Hammann, Response to Rogers, 38 U. FLA. L. REV.
205, 207-8 (1986); Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations in Adminis-
trative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 655, 661-69.
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2. A pre-leasing EIS analyzing not only the impacts of leasing, but
also the impacts of exploration, development, production, abandonment,
or a combination of these activities;
3. A pre-leasing EA analyzing the impacts of leasing only;
4. A pre-leasing EA analyzing not only the impacts of leasing, but
also the impacts of exploration, development, production, abandonment,
or a combination of these activities; or
5. A lease may be issued on the basis of an EA (or an EIS) with an
NSO stipulation, deferring completion of an EA or EIS with any of the
broadened scopes described above until receipt of a definite proposal for
development.
What should drive the choice of one procedure rather than the other?
The first step in answering this question is to identify what purpose a
pre-lease EIS serves and whether any substitutes for it exist.
Naturally, an EIS is only appropriate if potentially significant impacts
could result from the proposed action. A pre-leasing EIS would disclose
significant effects prior to the grant of any developmental right, however
limited, and could result in a decision not to lease. This would avoid a
crucial problem with the current system. Once a lease is issued, even with
an NSO stipulation negating the legal right to proceed, the playing field
between preservation and oil and gas activity is no longer level. A lessee
exists that will demand approval to recover potential oil and gas reserves.
The agency has also made a commitment to at least consider development
of the tract. Exploration or production pressures may distort future anal-
ysis.275 In appropriate situations, the agencies must confront the difficult
decision not to lease. 216 They therefore must obtain the information neces-
sary to make an informed decision.
The BLM and Forest Service do not approach these resource alloca-
tions isolated from other tasks. Both agencies must undertake compre-
hensive land use planning. The BLM is to prepare "Resource Management
Plans ' ' 1 7 and the Forest Service, predictably, creates "Forest Manage-
ment Plans. ' 7 EIS's accompany these plans and can reveal the signifi-
275. See, Secretary of Interior v. California, 464 U.S. at 342; Northern Cheyenne Tribe
v. Hodel, 851 F.2d 1152, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1988); Environmental Defense Fund, 596 F.2d
at 53; North Slope Borough, 486 F. Supp. at 351; Nelson supra note 17, at 13-15; and Noble,
supra note 21, at 157-58. Compare Nelson, supra note 17, at 45-46 (pressure for development
distorted legal precedents in Mountain States I); and Plater, In the Wake of the Snail Darter:
An Environmental Paradigm and Its Consequences, 19 U. MICH. J. LAw REFORM 805, 854-58
(1986) (Tellico Dam illustrates how proposals gain a life of their own within an agency despite
evidence of the irrationality of proceeding.).
276. For descriptions of reluctance to recommend against lease issuance, see Bob Mar-
shall Alliance, 685 F.Supp at 1520-21 and Edelson, supra note 20, at 951-53.
277. Section 202 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1712 (1982).
See generally National Wildlife Federation v. Burford, 835 F.2d at 320-22 and, for a discus-
sion of the precursors of these plans see Headwaters Inc. v. BLM, Bedford District, 684
F. Supp 1053 (D. Or. 1988).
278. Forest and Rangeland Renewable Resources Planning Act, as amended by the
National Forest Management Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1600-14 (1982 and Supp. III 1985). See generally
Comment supra note 38, at 436-50. For a criticism that these plans ignore mineral resources,
see Brooks, supra note 220, at 1-501-7.
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cant impacts of resource conflicts and suggest appropriate mitigation
measures. 7 They may identify lands that should not be leased. Con-
versely, oil and gas recovery could be the best use of certain lands despite
the presence of either mitigatable or non-mitigatable significant impacts.
NEPA does not require avoidance of all significant effects, but only that
decisions to proceed in the face of such adverse impacts are made know-
ingly. 280
In a perfect world, land use planning would precede not only oil and
gas leasing, 18 but all decisions on potential disturbances. More site-specific
analyses of definite proposals could then use the knowledge gained from
the comprehensive EIS and build on the earlier EIS.2 2 All activities,
however, cannot cease pending plan completion.2 13 Oil and gas lease deci-
sions may not always have the benefit of comprehensive planning EIS's.
Even without a current management plan, the BLM and the Forest
Service are not ignorant of the attributes of the lands they administer.
They must choose the appropriate level of NEPA analysis based on this
knowledge together with an estimate of what oil and gas activity is
reasonably likely to occur in an area. Refuge to nation-wide statistics will
not suffice.29
4
Rational judgments are possible despite a lack of certainty on the exis-
tence of a commercial oil or gas deposit in a particular area. An analo-
gous problem is addressing indirect effects of proposals such as "dis-
posal[s] of federal lands, when the identity or plans of future landowners
is unknown. "29 The CEQ responded to a question in this area:
[If there is total uncertainty about the identity of future land
owners or the the nature of future land uses, then of course, the
agency is not required to engage in speculation or contemplation
about their future plans. But, in the ordinary course of business,
people do make judgments based upon reasonably foreseeable
occurences. It will often be possible to consider the likely pur-
chasers and the development trends in that area or similiar areas
279. For a description of some BLM Resource Management Plans that attempt delinea-
tion of necessary stipulations, see Brooks, supra note 220, at 1-43 - 1-45. Congress has
requested a report from the National Academy of Sciences and Comptroller General on the
treatment of oil and gas resources in RMP's and MFP's. Leasing Reform Act, supra note
26, § 5111.
280. E.g., Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Association, 444 U.S. at 227-28.
281. Comment, supra note 38, at 437-40.
282. That is, a proper use of CEQ's tiering approach could occur. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.28
(1987). If a later EA reveals no additional significant impacts, another EIS would not be
required. The EA, however, would consider specific alternatives and mitigation measures
for the now more concrete proposal. See Headwaters Inc., 684 F. Supp. at 1055-56; and Sierra
Club, 774 F.2d at 1411. For a criticism that Park County misapplied this guidance see supra
note 165.
283. In fact, the agencies are explicitly precluded from deferring leasing decisions on
National Forest Lands until National Forest Plans are finished. The Energy Security Act
of 1979, 42 U.S.C. § 8855 (1982).
284. Cf. McCrum, NEPA Litigation Affecting Federal Mineral Leasing and Development
2 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENT 7, 57 (Spring 1986).
285. Forty Questions, supra note 226, at 18,031 (Question 18).
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in recent years .... The agency has the responsibility to make
an informed judgment, and to estimate future impacts on that
basis, especially if trends are ascertainable or potential purchasers
have made themselves known .... 186
Here, the question is whether the lands are likely to be developed for oil
or gas recovery and "business judgments" are possible. Geologists for
oil and gas companies routinely rank potential lease tracts both for acqui-
sition and drilling purposes. BLM geologists, no longer required to deline-
ate KGS's or to set minimum acceptable bids for competitive sales,287 can
also estimate a tract's potential for oil or gas reserves through experience
in adjacent areas or geologically similar formations. They can then predict
attendant levels of developmemt.
Armed with the initial appraisal of likely activity, the BLM and Forest
Service could then analyze the surface resources of the prospective lease
areas. The SIPP'8 balancing test suggests consideration of the following
factors to choose the appropriate level of analysis: 1) the likelihood that
oil and gas will actually be developed; 2) the extent information exists
currently on the environmental effects of proceeding with development;
3) the extent to which irretrievable commitments have been made and
other options thereby precluded; and 4) the severity of the impacts that
would result from implementing the activity.2 8 9
Although the Supreme Court rejected judicial use of the test to decide
when an E IS should be prepared, 90 nothing prevents its use by an agency
to choose between legally appropriate options under NEPA. It filters the
leasing decision through the relevant screens; namely, what rights are to
be granted, what mitigation measures exist, what particular resources
could be damaged, and what likely development will occur.
The agencies would then order their priorities: high rankings on either
severity of impacts from development or the likelihood of development
would require extensive initial analysis or upfront mitigation. Lands with
exceptionally high recreational, scientific, or wildlife values2'9 and rela-
tively high developmental potential would require an EIS to disclose sig-
nificant impacts and devise ways to avoid or mitigate the adverse results.
Although the agencies would not be able to predict perfectly how develop-
286. Id. See also City of Davis, 521 F.2d at 676, requiring an analysis of likely develop-
ment at a highway interchange.
287. Sections 5102(a) and (b) of the Leasing Reform Act, discussed supra note 30.
288. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094-98. For a criticism that the SIPI test is too flexible and
turns everything into a matter of degree see Barney, supra note 92, at 16-17.
289. SIPI, 481 F.2d at 1094. See also, County of Suffolk, 562 F.2d at 1378, which looked
at two questions to decide if analysis could be deferred: 1) whether the agency could obtain
meaningful information on future activity at the first analysis and 2) how important is the
missing information to a decision to proceed with the first step?
290. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. at 406.
291. Except for some lease offers outstanding on December 22, 1987, conflicts with poten-
tial wilderness should not exist. Section 5106 of the Leasing Reform Act, discussed supra
note 27. However, the scope of NEPA compliance in response to an initial well could be filtered
through the test.
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ment would occur, knowledge of the affected environment would increase
so that any decision to either preserve or sacrifice surface values would
be an informed one.
Areas with less pronounced conflicts between mineral recovery and
other resource use will require either an EA or an EIS. The choice depends
on a balancing of the level of reasonably foreseeable cumulative or con-
nected activities and the nature of the values that could be impacted. Alter-
natives must include not leasing as well as options to control development,
be it individual wells or full field development. This site-specific analysis
of a particular tract of land's attributes must be prepared in good faith,
with an acknowledgment that an EA might reveal unmitigatable signifi-
cant impacts and result in a decision to prepare an EIS. 92
The cases did provide the agencies with a blanket deferral mechanism:
no EIS is necessary if the lease authorizes no surface disturbance at all.
The BLM should only employ the NSO option when analysis reveals that
sensitive areas can be developed by drainage or directional drilling93 or
where there are unresolvable gaps in relevant information sufficient to
require a deferral of a decision on how or if development should proceed.294
Deferring decisions without firm reasons merely increases uncertainty for
both oil companies and preservationists. Reasoned analysis must occur
before lease issuance and the agency should not haphazardly avoid the
process by use of NSO stipulations.
The form this analysis takes may vary because NEPA recognizes that
differing actions may require divergent levels of analysis based on the
nature of the proposed action and the affected human environment. Forc-
ing the agencies to examine each factor in the balancing process best
serves the disparate goals of our society. Development and preservation
compete, while allocators made knowledgeable by the process make the
decision. When Congress has not demanded that either mineral develop-
ment or environmental amenities dominate any particular tract of public
land or National Forest, full information is a primary goal of the adminis-
trative process."'
Any decision to allocate lands based on predictions about subsurface
resources by definition will not be perfect. The BLM or Forest Service
may err in their forecasts of oil and gas activity on a tract and some unex-
pected sacrifices of surface values might result. Three significant
safeguards will help avoid environmental Armageddons: 1) the public can
alert the agencies to significant resources in proposed leased tracts;2 9
292. Cf Edelson, supra note 20, at 956-57 only those Forest Service EA's that were
site-specific led to prudent decisionmaking).
293. le., the original use of a stipulation forbidding surface occupancy.
294. Le., a reasoned use of the contingent rights philosophy. See critique of wholesale
use of NSO stipulations as a bad faith avoidance of NEPA responsibilities, Comment supra
note 71, at 189-93 and Comment, supra note 245, at 688 n.75.
295. Mansfield, supra note 54, at 488-507.
296. See provision for public notice of proposed lease terms, Leasing Reform Act, supra
note 26, § 5102(d), discussed supra note 90.
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2) oil company bidding in the now compulsory competitive process can
provide a check on the BLM's pre-offer analysis of likely development;
9 7
and 3) the agencies may mitigate subsequent surface disturbance pursuant
to their reserved powers.9 8 The Onshore Oil and Gas Leasing Reform Act
of 1987 greatly increased control of mineral leasing and the information
that would be available to assist the BLM in the balancing procedure.
It should enable the BLM to accommodate conflicting mandates to pro-
mote energy development and prevent unneccessary and undue degrada-
tion of natural resources. '99
The lesson that emerges from the controversy over the leasing of
onshore oil and gas has a broader import. It can aid agencies to deal with
the uncertain nature of impacts from other proposals. Mitigation and
reserved authority to cope with the unforeseen can tailor actions so that
NEPA analysis is based on a firm footing. The combined holdings also
reflect judicial concern that agencies be allowed to employ a rule of rea-
son to avoid speculative junkets that could prevent reasonable develop-
ment.300 Sufficient control must exist to avoid headlong rushes into envi-
ronmental disasters, but NEPA need not forsage "paralysis by analysis."
297. Leasing Reform Act, supra note 26, §§ 5102(a) and (b), discussed supra note 30.
The BLM can reassess a decision to offer a lease up until the time of signing. McDonald
771 F.2d at 463. If competitive interest in a tract belies the developmental ranking of the
BLM, it can, if necessary, undertake additional NEPA analysis resulting in a decision not
to lease or to reoffer the lease with different stipulations. Cf. suggestion that the non-
competitive system subsidized oil and gas leases and that a competitive system would allow
the market to pace leasing, Edelson, supra note 20, at 958-59 and discussion of Forest Serv-
ice's ability to reject timber contract bids. Prineville Sawmill Co. v. United States, 859 F.2d
905 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
298. See text at and authorities cited in notes 80-83 supra.
299. See, e.g., 43 U.S.C. § 1732 (1982) and Mansfield, supra note 54, at 493-95.
300. Compare treatment of requirement to consider "cumulative" hydrological impacts
from existing mines, the subject mine, and "anticipated" mines:
mT1he Secretary's decision represents a basic policy trade-off between holding
up or denying current mining permit applications until additional data about
possible future mining in the area is generated, and risking the possibility that
future mining in the same area may be delayed or precluded because the full
extent of mining activity was not fully anticipated and proper hydrological
safeguards were not required. Absent the expression of clear Congressional
intent to the contrary, there is no basis for judicial second-guessing. (empha-
sis in original) (citations omitted)
National Wildlife Federation v. Hode4 839 F.2d at 759.
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